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The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated 
new rules designed to harmonize and improve the “patchwork” 
exempt offering framework, protect investors and facilitate capital 
formation. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Labor announced 
that the fiduciary responsibility provisions of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 do not prohibit fiduciaries of 
401(k) and other individual account plans from investing in, and 
undertaking exposure to, private equity investments. These policies 
address the concern that retail investors are missing out on 
investment opportunities, due to fewer listed firms and initial public 
offerings, the greater role of the private market in raising money, and 
the rise in the number of unicorn firms. 
 
This Article details these concerns, assesses the policy changes 
within the broader context of private capital formation, and argues 
that some of them not only fail to provide a remedy, but may also 
induce greater harm and should not have been undertaken. Most 
importantly, policymakers must consider the rise of alternative 
venture capital (“AVC”) investors, and the ways in which those 
investors affect a unicorn firm, its capital needs, and the lack of 
disclosure of information, all of which affect future investors. Finally, 
this Article argues that to adequately protect retail investors, AVC 
investors ought to be considered when formulating policy decisions 
relating to investor protection and the capital formation needs of 
private companies. 
 
“Increasingly seems like we are entering a new reality in 
Unicorn land. If you have raised more than $250mm & are NOT 
public, the presumption is you are losing WAY too much money, and 
you probably have sh[***]y unit economics.” 
 
Bill Gurley, Benchmark Capital1 
 
 1. Bill Gurley (@bgurley), TWITTER (Jan. 11, 2020, 7:32 PM), 
https://twitter.com/bgurley/status/1216156071661719557?lang=en. 
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“There was a theory that the public and private markets for tech-
company shares had become disconnected, that venture capitalists 
and (particularly) non-traditional venture investors like mutual 
funds and (most particularly) SoftBank were now willing to pay 
higher prices than the public markets were, and that when those 
private investors eventually tried to sell to the public markets they’d 
run into trouble.” 
 




The press once celebrated Elizabeth Anne Holmes as the 
youngest female entrepreneur and billionaire.3 Holmes dropped out 
of Stanford University to start her own firm, Theranos, a blood-
testing startup. Holmes quickly raised billions of dollars from 
investors by using private placements, which are offerings of 
securities that are exempt from registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and not subject to broad disclosure 
requirements, such as audited financial statements. The investor 
groups were comprised of sophisticated, accredited institutional and 
individual investors. Thanks to the large amounts of capital that 
Theranos raised from these investors, it joined the prestigious 
“unicorn” club.4 Indeed, Holmes seemed to be living in the fast lane. 
 2. Matt Levine, The Unicorn Stampede is Coming, BLOOMBERG OP. (Mar. 22, 
2019, 11:58 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-22/the-
unicorn-stampede-is-coming. 
 3. Press Release, Forbes Staff, Forbes Announces Inaugural List of America's 
50 Richest Self-Made Women (May 27, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
forbespr/2015/05/27/forbes-announces-inaugural-list-of-americas-50-richest-self-
made-women/#455c348124c1. Unfortunately, Holmes is starring in the news these 
days for other reasons. She is the subject of the HBO documentary The Inventor: Out 
for Blood in Silicon Valley, and a book, titled Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon 
Valley Startup. 
 4. A unicorn has the following features for the purpose of this Article: young 
yet large, privately owned but “quasi-public,” invests in research and development 
(R&D) with intangible assets, VC-backed with concentrated ownership and 
controlling shareholders, and valued at over $1 billion. The term “unicorn” was 
coined in 2013 by Aileen Lee. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold? Equity 
Compensation & The Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613 (2017); Jennifer S. 
Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
583 (2016). A company is considered to be VC-backed if it was financed in its early 
stage by a VC fund. See Anat Alon-Beck, Insight: When Unicorn Employees Revolt 
and Push for IPO, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
securities-law/insight-when-unicorn-employees-revolt-and-push-for-ipo; see also 
Examining Private Market Exemptions as a Barrier to IPOs and Retail Investment: 
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Holmes appeared on the covers of magazines, while Theranos 
enjoyed the benefits of an “all-star” board of directors,5 including a 
medical advisory board.6  
Theranos’s funding bubble burst when the SEC charged Holmes 
with massive fraud.7 Holmes fooled patients, doctors, investors, 
journalists, White House officials, military generals, and employees.8 
Holmes, unfortunately, is not the only unicorn founder to get a lot of 
press coverage these days for breaking the law.9 The Chief Executive 
Officers (“CEOs”) of WeWork, Uber, and Zenefits have all resigned 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inv. Prot., Entrepreneurship, and Cap. Mkts. of the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 116th Cong. 10 (2019) (written statement of Renee M. Jones, 
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School) [hereinafter Statement of Renee Jones] 
(citing Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options—Golden Goose or Trojan Horse?, 
2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107 (2019) [hereinafter Unicorn Stock Options]). 
 5. There were many celebrities on the Theranos Board of Directors, including 
U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz, William Perry (former U.S. Secretary of 
Defense), Henry Kissinger (former U.S. Secretary of State), Sam Nunn (former U.S. 
Senator), Bill Frist (former U.S. Senator and heart-transplant surgeon), Gary 
Roughead (Admiral, U.S. Navy, retired), James Mattis (General, U.S. Marine 
Corps), Richard Kovacevich (former Wells Fargo Chairman and CEO), and Riley 
Bechtel (chairman of the board and former CEO at Bechtel Group). See Lydia 
Pflanzer, How Elizabeth Holmes Convinced Powerful Men like Henry Kissinger, 
James Mattis, and George Shultz to Sit on the Board of Now Disgraced Blood-Testing 
Startup Theranos, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2019, 9:44 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/theranos-former-board-members-henry-kissinger-
george-shultz-james-mattis-2019-3. 
 6. The Theranos medical advisory board included past presidents and board 
members of the American Association for Clinical Chemistry, such as Susan A. 
Evans, William Foege, former director U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), David Helfet, director of the Orthopedic Trauma Service at the 
Hospital for Special Surgery and professors, Ann M. Gronowski, Larry J. Kricka, 
Jack Ladenson, Andy O. Miller and Steven Spitalnik. See Jon Brooks, Theranos 
Turns to New Medical Advisers to Help Validate Technology, KQED (Apr. 7, 2016), 
https://www.kqed.org/futureofyou/141585/theranos-says-new-medical-advisors-will-
help-publish-data. 
 7. In June 2018, a federal grand jury indicted Holmes on nine counts of wire 
fraud and two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. See Theranos Founder and 
Former Chief Operating Officer Charged in Alleged Wire Fraud Schemes, U.S. 
ATT’Y’S OFF., N. DIST. CAL. (June 15, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
ndca/pr/theranos-founder-and-former-chief-operating-officer-charged-alleged-wire-
fraud-schemes. 
 8. See Monica Torres, 4 Ways Elizabeth Holmes Manipulated Her Theranos 
Employees, HUFFPOST (Mar. 22, 2019, 12:57 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ 
elizabeth-holmes-office-employees_l_5c92abe3e4b01b140d351b6f. 
 9. See Erin Griffith, The Ugly Unethical Underside of Silicon Valley, FORTUNE 
(Dec. 28, 2016, 6:30 AM), http://fortune.com/silicon-valley-startups-fraud-venture-
capital/; Monica Watrous, What Happened to Hampton Creek?, FOOD BUS. NEWS 
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/11575-what-happened-to-
hampton-creek.  
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within the last three years due to various allegations of 
mismanagement and fraud.10  
These stories on mismanagement and fraud are drawing public 
attention to the operations, management, corporate governance 
structures, and financings of unicorn firms. Despite these reports 
and the risks associated with investing in private firms,11 retail 
investors have been demanding a piece of the action.  
Access to investments in illiquid high-risk privately held firms, 
such as unicorns, is usually reserved to accredited sophisticated 
investors, such as ultrarich individuals and large institutions. But 
this is changing. There are powerful industry groups, such as the 
Institute for Portfolio Alternatives,12 which recently successfully 
lobbied lawmakers to enable more Americans to access investments 
in private markets.13 
The Institute for Portfolio Alternatives is not alone. Other 
thought leaders and organizations, including the Committee on 
Capital Markets Regulation, an independent research organization 
with thirty-five members drawn from the finance, business, law, 
accounting, and academic communities, were also concerned that 
ordinary retail investors14 were missing out on investment 
 10. Marisa Kendall, SEC Fines Zenefits, Ousted CEO Nearly $1 Million Over 
Insurance Scandal, SILICON BEAT (Oct. 27, 2017, 9:17 AM), 
http://www.siliconbeat.com/2017/10/27/sec-fines-zenefits-ousted-ceo-nearly-1-million-
insurance-scandal/. On the WrkRiot scandal, see Nuala Sawyer Bishari, CEO of Tech 
Startup WrkRiot Convicted of Fraud, SFWEEKLY (Feb. 5, 2018, 5:21 PM) 
http://www.sfweekly.com/news/ceo-of-tech-startup-wrkriot-convicted-of-fraud/. 
 11. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
309 (1976). For further discussion on agency problems and strategies to reduce them, 
see generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH (Reinier H. Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).  
 12. See Mark Schoeff, Jr., Private Fund Group Lobbies to Get Products in 
401(k)s, INV. NEWS (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.investmentnews.com/private-fund-
group-lobbies-use-products-retirement-plans-197262; Policy Advocacy that Advances 
the Industry, INST. FOR PORTFOLIO INITIATIVES (IPA), http://www.ipa.com/policy-
advocacy/#issues (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
 13. See Paul Kiernan, SEC Proposes Giving More Investors Access to Private 
Markets, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2019, 6:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-
proposes-giving-more-investors-access-to-private-markets-11576691685. See 
generally COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REGUL., EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. 
INVESTORS AND RETIREES: PRIVATE EQUITY (2018). 
 14. “Retail investors” refers to investors that do not qualify under the SEC’s 
accredited investor standard or qualified purchaser standard. The accredited 
investor standard “prohibits investors with less than $1 million in assets or $200,000 
in annual income from directly investing in private funds.” COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. 
REGUL., supra note 13, at 2. The qualified purchaser standard “prohibits investors 
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opportunities due to the decrease in the number of publicly listed 
firms, the decline in the volume of initial public offerings (“IPOs”), 
the fact that more money is being raised in private markets, and the 
rise in the number of unicorns.15 They argued that it was not “fair” 
that mainly institutional investors and high-net-worth individuals16 
were able to access private markets and benefit from them.17 They 
advocated for change and managed to convince regulators to act, 
supposedly for the primary purpose of democratizing and equalizing 
access to the private market. 
The COVID-19 outbreak, which disrupted our lives, health and 
financial markets,18 also provided a fertile ground for sweeping 
regulatory changes. President Trump instructed the federal 
government agencies to level the playing field and provide 
opportunities for ordinary retail investors. On May 19, 2020, 
President Trump issued Regulatory Relief to Support Economic 
Recovery Executive Order 13924, which directed agencies “to remove 
barriers to the greatest engine of economic prosperity the world has 
ever known: the innovation, initiative, and drive of the American 
with less than $5 million in investments from directly investing in private funds that 
have more than 100 investors. Approximately 87% of U.S. households do not meet 
the accredited investor standard, and approximately 98% of U.S. households do not 
meet the qualified purchaser standard.” Id.; see also Letter from Hal S. Scott et al., 
President, Comm. on Cap. Mkts. Regul., to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 31, 2020). 
 15. See generally Statement of Renee Jones, supra note 4. 
 16. Or workers with defined-benefit pension plans. It should be noted that 
“since defined-benefit plans have also become a much less popular option for 
employer retirement offerings, retail investors have had little exposure to private 
equity in recent years.” Jon Hartley, 401(k) Plans Finally Can Invest in Private 
Equity, Leveling the Playing Field, NAT. REV. (Aug. 19, 2020), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/08/401k-plans-investing-private-equity-levels-
playing-field/. 
 17. See id.  
 18. In the United States, the pandemic constituted a national emergency 
beginning on March 1, 2020. See Anat Alon-Beck, Amid Vast Employee Layoffs, We 
Should Bail Out Tech Startups During the Coronavirus Crisis, FORBES (May 6, 
2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/05/06/amid-vast-employee-
layoffs-we-should-bail-out-tech-startups-during-the-coronavirus-
crisis/?sh=4e0618304420; Anat Alon-Beck, Stakeholder Capitalism: Should 
Employees Demand Change?, FORBES (June 11, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/anatalonbeck/2020/06/11/stakeholder-capitalism-should-employees-demand-
change/?sh=70e73f733b7d; Anat Alon-Beck, When Life Gives You Lemons, Make 
‘Lemonade’ or Something Like It, FORBES (July 2, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/anatalonbeck/2020/07/02/when-life-gives-you-lemons-make-lemonade-or-
something-like-it/?sh=75d6d37e497c. 
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people” so that we will be able to “overcome the effects the virus has 
had on our economy.”19 
Accordingly, the U.S. SEC and Department of Labor (“DOL”) 
have promulgated new rules designed to protect investors while 
opening access to investments in private markets. The SEC adopted 
amendments to “facilitate capital formation and increase 
opportunities for investors by expanding access to capital for small 
and medium-sized businesses and entrepreneurs across the United 
States.” The SEC enacted these amendments to “simplify, 
harmonize, and improve certain aspects of the exempt offering 
framework to promote capital formation while preserving or 
enhancing important investor protections.”20 Previously, the SEC 
also revised and modernized the “accredited investor” framework.21  
These changes may encourage both sophisticated and non-
accredited investors to invest in illiquid securities of high-risk 
private ventures. They may also diminish the already limited 
investor protections in private markets. The entire securities 
regulatory scheme is centered on the concept of disclosure of 
information to improve price discovery, efficiency and reduce 
information asymmetry. Without disclosure, non-accredited 
purchasers will not be able to make informed decisions, especially 
about the risks associated with investing in privately held firms.  
 19. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Issues 
Information Letter on Private Equity Investments (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20200603-0. 
20Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities by 
Improving Access to Capital in Private Markets, Securities Act Release No. 10884, 
Exchange Act Release No. 90300, Investment Company Act Release No. 34082 (Nov. 
2, 2020) [hereinafter Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment 
Opportunities]. 
 21. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Modernizes the Accredited 
Investor Definition (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-
191; see also Letter from Christine Lazaro & Samuel Edwards, President & Exec. 
Vice President of the Pub. Invs. Advoc. Bar Ass’n, to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 24, 2019) (“it appears the Commission has lost 
sight of its primary objective—protecting investors—in the Concept Release. With 
few exceptions, each section of the Concept Release—from its discussion of the 
‘accredited investor’ definition to Secondary Trading of Certain Securities—is more 
concerned with providing greater access to funds for exempt offering issuers than it 
is in providing necessary protections to public investors.”); Christopher Schelling, 
The Dangerous Democratization of Alternatives, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Feb. 19, 2020), 
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1kdx135rgwcb0/The-Dangerous-
Democratization-of-Alternatives; Angela Segal, The SEC Wants to Democratize 
Private Investments, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Sep. 19, 2020), 
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1h76258fbfzjb/The-SEC-Wants-to-
Democratize-Private-Investments. 
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Large investment firms, such as private equity funds, may also 
be interested in gaining access to the individual investor market. It 
appears that democratizing access to private markets is not only the 
SEC’s priority. The DOL announced recently in an information letter 
that 401(k) plan fiduciaries have the ability to invest in private 
equity funds.22 This announcement drew much criticism and media 
attention. There are many risks associated with investing in illiquid 
assets and with monitoring private fund investment advisers. To 
illustrate, note that the SEC recently issued a risk alert with 
regards to investigations and enforcement actions against private 
fund investment advisers on lack of disclosures of potential conflicts 
of interest, excessive fees, and failures to implement policies on 
insider trading.23 This Article will explore some of these concerns.  
Should regulators encourage retail investors to invest in private 
markets, which were previously limited to sophisticated and wealthy 
players, such as accredited individuals and institutions?24 Despite 
the best intentions of regulators, their policy changes may fail to 
have the intended positive effect for investors, retirees, and 
entrepreneurs while also needlessly placing these groups at 
heightened risk. This Article details these concerns, takes a look at 
the new policies, and argues that some of them fail to provide 
protections and should not have been changed. These new policies 
create more problems than they resolve.  
The central issue is that policymakers and regulators must 
consider the rise in alternative venture capital investors and the 
ways in which those investors affect a unicorn firm, its capital needs, 
and the lack of disclosure of information, which affects current and 
future investors. Taking the rise of alternative venture capital 
investors and their influence into account may result in better policy 
design and help mitigate some of the risks.  
The Article sheds light on the increasingly long and intricately 
complex array of new investors that regulators need to consider 
when making policy decisions on investor protection and capital 
formation needs of private companies. In the last few years, new, 
non-traditional, deep-pocketed market actors have been making 
notable investments in large private technology firms, which 
historically were dominated by venture capital investors (“VC”). 
 22. See infra Part I.  
 23. See infra Part I. 
 24. Benjamin Bain & Sabrina Willmer, Private Equity Abuzz Over Access to $6 
Trillion 401(k) Market, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2020, 2:30 PM), 
https://www.bloombergquint.com/businessweek/private-equity-is-coming-for-the-6-
trillion-401-k-market. 
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Institutional and high-net-worth investors, such as SoftBank, 
mutual funds, hedge funds, corporate venture capitalists, private 
equity, and sovereign wealth funds (together, “alternative venture 
capital” or “AVC” investors) are turning their attention to private 
markets in the hopes of capitalizing on the high returns of unicorn 
firms before they do an IPO.25  
The interest of these deep-pocket market actors has reversed the 
competitive landscape of unicorn funding. Rather than unicorn firms 
competing for a limited pool of funding, unicorns are able to attract a 
nearly limitless pool of funds, leaving the deep-pockets to compete 
for the chance to invest. This reversal substantially alters the 
governance of the unicorn firm and nature of the relationships 
between unicorns and their investors.26 
Currently, retail investors, researchers, and regulators do not 
have detailed information on the identity of the new investors in our 
private markets, their incentives, their risk tolerance, the 
contractual terms for which they negotiate, or other relevant data, 
which is needed to understand the new developments in the private 
markets. This Article fills the gap.  
Alternative venture capital investors (“AVCs”) are focused on 
financing unicorns because of their potential to disrupt the market, 
transform entire industries, and add value to their portfolios. In 
some instances, AVCs are even outbidding traditional VC 
investors.27 Unicorn founders and AVCs have common interests. 
Unicorn founders are interested in continuing to control their firm 
 25. See Jamie Hutchinson, Presentation at the Meeting of SEC Advisory 
Committee on Small and Emerging Companies: Why Are More Companies Staying 
Private? 2–5 (Feb. 15, 2017) (presentation slides available at https://www.sec.gov/ 
info/smallbus/acsec/hutchinson-goodwin-presentation-acsec-021517.pdf); Matt 
Levine, Unicorn Buybacks and Securities Law, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2017, 9:33 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-16/unicorn-buybacks-and-
securities-law; see also Begum Erdogan et al., Grow Fast or Die Slow: Why Unicorns 
are Staying Private, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 11, 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/ 
industries/high-tech/our-insights/grow-fast-or-die-slow-why-unicorns-are-staying-
private. See generally Craig Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public Corporation or Eclipse 
of the Public Markets?, 30 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2018) [Hereinafter Doidge et al., 
Eclipse]; Craig Doidge et al., The U.S. Left Behind? Financial Globalization and the 
Rise of IPOs Outside the U.S., 110 J. FIN. ECON. 546 (2013) [hereinafter Doidge et al., 
The U.S. Left Behind]; Craig Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 
464 (2017) [hereinafter Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap]; Xiaohui Gao et al., 
Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN.& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663 (2013). 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See infra Part III for discussion on traditional venture capital investors.  
992 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87.983 
by remaining private longer28––not subjecting themselves, their 
management decisions,29 trade secrets, or strategy to public market 
scrutiny.30 For unicorn founders, AVC is a new and very attractive 
path to allow early equity investors to exit, by providing liquidity for 
shareholders that are locked in,31 without requiring a traditional 
trade sale or IPO.32 AVCs are also interested in investing in 
unicorns, thanks to recent changes to our securities laws, the decline 
in IPOs,33 the extended period of low interest rates, a blend of 
 28. See Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, The Deregulation of the Private 
Equity Markets and the Decline in IPOs 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working 
Paper No. 26317, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3461485. 
 29. For a discussion on the motives to go public, see Richard A. Booth, The 
Limited Liability Company and the Search for a Bright Line Between Corporations 
and Partnerships, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 79, 89–92 (1997). See generally James C. 
Brau & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and 
Practice, 61 J. FIN. 399 (2006) (survey on decisions to do an IPO). 
 30. Les Brorsen, Looking Behind the Declining Number of Public Companies, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 18, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/18/looking-behind-the-declining-number-of-
public-companies/; see MCKINSEY & CO., MCKINSEY GLOBAL PRIVATE MARKET 
REVIEW 2018, THE RISE AND RISE OF PRIVATE MARKETS (2018); Josh Lerner et al., 
Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns (Euro. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 675, 2020), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2897254; Matt Levine, Unicorns Take Different Paths to Being Public, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2018, 10:13 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
opinion/articles/2018-03-27/unicorns-take-different-paths-to-being-public; see also 
Andrew Nussbaum et al., Private Equity—Year in Review and 2020 Outlook, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 8, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2020/02/08/private-equity-year-in-review-and-2020-outlook/. 
 31. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
1, 7 (2012) (introducing the term “investor lock-in”); see also Margaret M. Blair, 
Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 
1, 26 (2004).  
 32. For more on the exit strategy of traditional investors—VCs, see D. Gordon 
Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 316 (2005). For 
helpful background on the distinction between cash-flow and control rights, see 
Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law 
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 784–85 (2017); see also William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 
1875 (2013); Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist 
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 981–82 (2006); Manuel A. Utset, 
Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture 
Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 61 (2002).  
 33. The decline in IPOs has gained attention from the media, policymakers, 
and academics. See Corrie Driebusch, IPO Market Isn’t Quite Back as Many Startups 
Are Still Holding Out, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2017, 4:47 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-market-isnt-quite-back-as-many-startups-are-still-
holding-out-1499252401; Keith Wright, Silicon Valley Tech Bubble is Larger Than It 
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financial and strategic incentives, and other geo-political 
considerations.34  
This Article advances the traditional corporate governance and 
entrepreneurship literature, which over the last thirty years mainly 
focused on VCs as the dominant source of financing startups.35 As 
noted in further detail in this Article, the U.S. regulatory landscape 
is changing in order to deal with these developments.  
The analysis sheds some light on AVCs’ ability and incentive to 
negotiate for aggressive redemption rights and anti-dilution 
provisions, and influence corporate governance arrangements, which 
are critical for monitoring unicorn managers.36 Monitoring the 
actions of unicorn founders is necessary to prevent misbehavior, 
such as rent-seeking, corruption, or other illegal activities.37  
This Article establishes a novel, comprehensive framework 
within which a deeper understanding of market contracting, 
regulatory changes, and policy surrounding unicorn firms can be 
achieved. The subsequent parts of this Article examine the rise in 
AVC financings, changes to traditional investment patterns in 
startups, and changes to the VC ecosystem.  
Part I introduces the new regulatory landscape that is intended 
to democratize access to private markets and offer opportunities for 
retail investors to participate. It introduces the issues the SEC and 
DOL have attempted to mitigate and their proposed remedies. It 
breaks down why the some of the remedies are problematic due to 
the potential risks to investor protection.  
Part II introduces some of the new rulemakings that are 
designed to facilitate capital formation by expanding exempt 
Was in 2000, and the End is Coming, CNBC (May 22, 2018, 6:05 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/22/tech-bubble-is-larger-than-in-2000-and-the-end-is-
coming.html; see also Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital 
and the Decline of Public Companies, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 449 (2017); Adley 
Bowden & Andy White, Private vs. Public Market Investors: Who’s Reaping the Gains 
from the Rise of Unicorns?, PITCHBOOK (June 19, 2018), https://pitchbook.com/news/ 
articles/private-vs-public-market-investors-whos-reaping-the-gains-from-the-rise-of-
unicorns; Scott Kupor, Where Have All the IPOs Gone, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (June 
19, 2017), https://a16z.com/2017/06/19/ipos/. See generally Oversight of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., & Urb. Affs., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 34. See infra Part II.  
 35. See Paul Gompers et al., How Do Venture Capitalists Make Decisions? 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22587, 2016), https://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w22587. 
 36. See infra Part II. 
 37. See infra Part I. 
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offerings. It explains the ways in which early stage and late stage 
startup firms raise capital. The concern is that the current policy 
trend and regulatory actions to expand exempt offerings may drive 
the decline of public markets.  
Part III explores the forces that have caused the expansion of 
AVC investors. It analyzes the ownership structures, control rights, 
monitoring, incentives, and collective bargaining powers of AVC 
investors and how they are shaping a new VC ecosystem. It sheds 
light on the motivation of AVC investors to advance capital to 
unicorn firms.  
Part IV expands the analysis of the rise in AVC investors and 
the ways in which those investors affect a unicorn firm, its capital 
needs, and corporate governance mechanisms. It further explains 
how the lack of disclosure of information may affect future investors 
in such firms. The last part concludes.  
 
I. DEMOCRATIZING ACCESS TO PRIVATE MARKETS 
 
On June 18, 2019, the SEC published the Concept Release on 
Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions (the “Concept 
Release”)38 to solicit responses to several questions, including 
whether to expand investment opportunities and allow retail 
investors to invest in private investment funds.39  
On September 9, 2019, while delivering a speech to the Economic 
Club of New York, SEC Chairman Clayton stated that the SEC is 
“examining whether appropriately structured funds can facilitate 
Main Street investor access to private investments in a manner that 
ensures incentive alignment with professional investors—similar to 
our public markets—and otherwise provides appropriate investor 
protections.”40  
It appears that the SEC was successful in opening access to 
private markets and expanding opportunities for some investors. On 
August 26, 2020, the SEC amended the definition of “accredited 
 38. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Seeks Public Comment on 
Ways to Harmonize Private Securities Offering Exemptions (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-97. 
 39. See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, 
Securities Act Release No. 10649, Exchange Act Release No. 86192, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 33512, 84 Fed. Reg. 30460, 30460 (June 26, 2019) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 227, 230, 239, 240, 249, 270 274, 275) [hereinafter 
Concept Release on Harmonization].  
 40. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Economic 
Club of New York (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-
2019-09-09. 
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investor” in Rule 215 and Rule 501(a) of Regulation D and expanded 
the definition of “qualified institutional buyer” in Rule 144A, under 
the Securities Act of 1933. These definitions determine which 
individuals and institutions are able to participate in private capital 
markets. 
As noted above, large investment firms, such as private equity 
funds, have been interested in tapping the individual investor 
market for quite some time. Some influential groups and academics 
support this move. To illustrate, two years ago, in November 2018, 
the Committee on Capital Market Regulation released a report 
entitled “Expanding Opportunities for Investors and Retirees: 
Private Equity,”41 which included several proposals to encourage 
U.S. policymakers to allow non-accredited investors to invest in 
private equity firms and indirectly in unicorns.  
The report introduced three main suggestions for expanding the 
current regulatory securities and labor law regimes. First, the report 
established a call for a securities law legislative reform to allow non-
accredited investors to directly invest in private equity funds.42 
Second, the report established a call for a securities law reform to 
allow public closed-end funds to invest in private equity funds. 
Currently, the SEC has an informal 15% limit on public closed-end 
fund investments in private equity funds.43 And finally, the report 
included a suggestion for the DOL to grant 401(k) plans the ability 
to invest in private equity funds.44 
The DOL recently made the report’s third proposal a reality. On 
June 3, 2020, the Employee Benefit Security Administration of the 
DOL announced in an information letter45 that the provisions on 
fiduciary responsibility in the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”) allow fiduciaries of 401(k) plans 
to include diversified investment options with private equity 
exposure, if certain requirements are met.46 This means that 401(k) 
 41. COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REGUL., supra note 13.  
 42. Id. at 36. 
 43. Id. at 42.  
 44. Id. at 64. 
 45. Letter from Louis J. Campagna, Chair, Div. of Fiduciary Interpretations, 
Dep’t of Lab., to Jon W. Breyfogle, Groom L. Grp. (June 3, 2020). 
 46. See Elizabeth Dyer et al., New DOL Guidance Provides Road Map for 401(k) 
Plans to Invest into PE Funds, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (June 18, 2020) 
https://www.kirkland.com/publications/995harton995-alert/2020/06/dol-information-
letter; Department of Labor Allows Private Equity Investment Exposure in 401(k) 
Plans, PAUL HASTINGS (June 9, 2020), https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-
items/details/?id=4a527d6f-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded.  
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plan and individual retirement account fiduciaries now have a 
roadmap to offer investment in private equity funds.47  
In the past, plan fiduciaries did not include investment options 
with an exposure to private equity (“PE”) in their 401(k) plans 
because they were concerned about potential lawsuits and exposure 
to liability for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.48  
The media gave this letter a lot of attention. Critics expressed 
their concern that this development would not benefit retail 
investors but rather might worsen “wealth inequality by sucking a 
huge pile of money out of the pockets of workers saving for 
retirement and shepherding it to the few fabulously wealthy owners 
of private equity firms.”49 Critics are especially concerned about the 
high, excessive, or hidden PE fee arrangements.50  
PE investments may have high investment management fees, as 
compared to mutual funds and other investment vehicles that are 
included in these plans and, therefore, without appropriate policy 
design may not be suitable for individual account plans.51 Critics 
have also expressed concern about PE investment options that can 
be too risky or complex or complex for investors to evaluate.52  
To illustrate the risks associated with monitoring private fund 
investment advisers or relying on them to do the monitoring for 
 47. See Robin Kaiser-Schatzlein, Letting Private Equity Billionaires Rob Worker 
Retirement Funds, AM. PROSPECT (June 18, 2020), https://prospect.org/economy/ 
letting-private-equity-billionaires-rob-worker-retirement-funds/. 
 48. For more on fiduciary duty, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103-1104 (2018) (ERISA); see 
also Dyer et al., supra note 46. 
 49. Kaiser-Schatzlein, supra note 47; see also Department of Labor is Using the 
Pandemic as a Pretext to Open High-Risk, High-Fees, High-Leverage Predatory 
Private Equity Investments to Retirees, BETTER MKTS. (June 3, 2020), 
https://bettermarkets.com/newsroom/department-labor-using-pandemic-pretext-
open-high-risk-high-fees-high-leverage-predatory (“The last thing the Department of 
Labor should be doing is enabling or encouraging retiree money to be diverted from 
transparent public markets with significant disclosure and investor protections to 
high-risk, dark private markets with little disclosure and few investor protections. 
To use the pandemic as a pretext for this irresponsible action is adding insult to 
injury.”). 
 50. Department of Labor is Using the Pandemic as a Pretext, supra note 49. 
 51. Lennine Occhino, DOL Issues Guidance about Private Equity Investments in 
401(k) Plans, MAYER BROWN (June 8, 2020),  
https://www.usbenefits.law/2020/06/dol-issues-guidance-about-private-equity-
investments-in-401k-plans; Department of Labor Allows Private Equity Investment 
Exposure in 401(k) Plans, supra note 46; DOL Gives OK to Private Equity in 
Diversified 401(k)Funds, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. (June 16, 2020), 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/dol-gives-ok-to-
private-equity-in-diversified-401k-funds.aspx.  
 52. Occhino, supra note 51.  
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retail investors, note that the SEC Office of Compliance Inspections 
and Examinations (OCIE) issued a risk alert on June 23, 2020.53 The 
risk alert highlights numerous problems that the SEC identified 
after examining enforcement actions involving private fund advisers 
(PE and hedge funds). The risk alert addresses the following three 
areas: (1) lack of disclosures of potential conflicts of interest, (2) 
charging excessive fees, and (3) not instituting policies and 
procedures regarding codes of ethics and insider trading.54  
Several politicians responded to the changes allowing 401(k) 
plans to invest in PE. On June 12, 2020, Senator Sherrod Brown (D-
Ohio), Ranking Member of the Senate Banking Committee, along 
with six other senators, including Elizabeth Warren (D-Ma.) and 
Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), sent a letter to DOL Secretary Eugene 
Scalia55 asking the DOL to reevaluate its position, as follows: 
 
Private equity has a long-standing track record of 
profiting at the expense of workers. When investors 
purchase a company, they actually have little 
incentive to ensure the company improves its 
performance. The managers of the fund profit from 
the management fees they impose, and they are free 
to use the companies they acquire to take out loans 
that are later paid as dividends. They can sell off the 
assets of the companies they acquire and assume 
little risk for the bets they make. These perverse 
incentives, investor-friendly rules, and gaps in 
private equity transparency and governance 
ultimately put workers at risk of losing their pay, 
their benefits, their jobs, and their livelihoods.56 
 
It is true that there is inequality in the sense that retail 
investors are not able to invest in and benefit from private 
investment funds or unicorn firms (unless they invested with 
 53. OFF. OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, RISK ALERT: OBSERVATIONS FROM EXAMINATIONS OF INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS MANAGING PRIVATE FUNDS (2020). 
 54. There may be other risks to consider and some of these issues may not be 
relevant to particular funds.  
 55. Letter from Sen. Sherrod Brown, Sen. Bernard Sanders, Sen. Sheldon 
Whitehouse, Sen. Edward J. Markey, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Sen. Tammy Balwin, & 
Sen. Jeffrey A. Merkley, senators, U.S. Senate, to Eugene Scalia, Sec’y, Dep’t of Lab. 
(June 12, 2020).  
 56. Id. 
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participating mutual funds or other investment funds). However, our 
securities laws were designed to protect them because investing in 
private markets is very risky and there is a problem of illiquidity.  
In light of these developments and the rise in AVC investors, this 
Article advocates for more, not less, investor protection. Part II 
deepens the analysis of how investment in unicorn firms is prone to 
high risks, agency costs, and collective action problems, which can 
“hinder price discovery, liquidity, and information quality in the 
absence of regulation.”57  
Accredited sophisticated investors are able to bargain and 
protect their interests (negotiate for anti-dilution or redemption 
rights) when investing in illiquid risky ventures. But who is going to 
protect the interests of non-accredited investors? The purpose of our 
trust and securities laws, specifically the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is to provide the public with 
indispensable information concerning the offerings, the risks, and 
the companies themselves.  
Retail investors should not have more exposure to private 
markets, via PE funds or otherwise, without more protections. If 
policymakers allow retail investors to invest in private markets, by 
using PEs or other private fund advisers, they must first adopt new 
laws and demand more transparency from these private market 
actors. They must protect investors from illegal fee practices and 
other issues raised above. Private ordering alone cannot substitute 
the protections afforded by public markets.58    
The initiatives are meant to deal with the increasing inequality 
of equity ownership in the United States and provide investment 
opportunities for retail investors.59 However, policymakers and 
 57. Letter from Elisabeth D. de Fontenay et al., Professor of L., Duke Univ. 
Sch. Of L., to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 24, 2019) 
(“[I]nvesting in private securities would pose considerable additional risks for retail 
investors, relative to investing in public securities, and existing research suggests 
that these additional risks would not be sufficiently offset by higher expected 
returns.”); see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a 
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).  
 58. See Letter from Elisabeth D. de Fontenay et al. to Vanessa Countryman, 
supra note 57. 
 59. For more on inequality metrics and research, see Thomas Piketty & 
Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 
1 (2003); see also Juliana Menasce Horowitz et al., Trends in Income and Wealth 
Inequality, PEW RSCH. CTR.: SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (2020), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/01/09/trends-in-income-and-wealth-inequality/ 
(Since 2009, “[e]conomic inequality, whether measured through gaps in income or 
wealth between richer and poorer households, continues to widen.”).  
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academics dispute the benefits of these changes to retail investors 
due to the fact that investments in private markets are also 
associated with “higher fees, less liquidity, and less regulatory 
oversight.”60 Private markets do not offer the same protections and 
disclosure of information as public markets.  
Given the risks associated with investing in private firms, 
especially unicorn firms, the Article advocates for additional investor 
protections, not less. It sheds light on these new developments, the 
push for excessive risk in return for aggressive growth, and the 
incentive misalignment between the different types of accredited 
sophisticated investors that currently invest in private markets, 
specifically in unicorn firms. There are many risks associated with 
investing in privately held firms, including uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, and adverse selection.61 
SEC Commissioner Allison Lee also expressed reservation about 
these developments and stated that “These proposed changes all go 
in one policy direction—toward expanding the pool of investors in 
the opaque, and indisputably high-risk, private markets.”62 Former 
SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson also suggested that we need to 
adequately analyze the relevant data prior to expanding these 
definitions and changing our laws.63  
The recent changes to our securities laws make it easier for 
unicorns to continue to raise large amounts of capital by using more 
exemptions from registration. These changes also lowered some of 
 60. Jeff Benjamin, Financial Advisers Bristle at SEC’s Pitch to Redefine 
‘Accredited Investor,’ INV. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.investmentnews.com/ 
financial-advisers-bristle-at-secs-pitch-to-redefine-accredited-investor-70729; see also 
Examining Private Market Exemptions as a Barrier to IPOs and Retail Investment: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inv. Prot., Entrepreneurship, & Cap. Mkts. of the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. (2019) (written statement of Elisabeth de 
Fontenay, Professor of Law, Duke University) [hereinafter de Fontenay Written 
Statement]; Letter from James C. Allen & Stephen Dean, CFA Inst., to Vanessa 
Countryman, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June 12, 2020); Erik F. Gerding, The Cost 
to Retail Investors and Public Markets of “Harmonizing” Securities 
Offering Exemptions, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/10/01/the-cost-to-retail-investors-and-
public-markets-of-harmonizing-securities-offering-exemptions/.  
 61. See infra Part III. 
 62. Allison Herren Lee, Statement by Commissioner Lee on Proposed Expansion 
of the Accredited Investor Definition, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 
20, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/20/statement-by-commissioner-
lee-on-proposed-expansion-of-the-accredited-investor-definition/. Commissioner Lee 
criticized the final rule for weakening investor protection (especially for seniors), and 
for failing to index for inflation going forward. 
 63. Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on 
Reducing Investor Protections Around Private Markets (Dec. 18, 2019). 
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the disclosure requirements for non-accredited investors. The policy 
goal behind the new rulemaking is meant to facilitate capital 
formation for private firms and expand investment opportunities for 
retail investors and, by doing so, also improve access to capital in 
private markets. Despite the best intentions of regulators, their 
policy changes may not help investors, retirees, and entrepreneurs 
and may even put them at greater risk for the reasons detailed 
below.  
The following explains the nature of the relationships between 
startups and their investors and the access to capital in private 
markets.  
 
    II. ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN PRIVATE MARKETS 
 
Regulators explained that one of the policy goals behind 
expanding the exempt offering framework is to facilitate capital 
formation and improve access to capital in private markets for small 
issuers that are underserved by traditional capital raisings.64  
There is a need to expand access to capital to small and 
underserved businesses, such as those that are owned by minorities, 
women, and veterans, or are located in depressed regions or non-
technology clusters.65 But it is not clear that expanding the exempt 
offering framework will improve capital formation opportunities for 
such businesses.  
First, location and industry concentration may be important to 
investors. To illustrate, note that venture capital investors who 
traditionally invest in startups do not have a nationwide presence, 
and are frequently organized as small partnerships.66 They are 
“hands on” investors who prefer to monitor their investments very 
closely. They also provide mentoring and other management services 
for the startups that they invest in. Such investors usually prefer to 
invest in startups that are close to their geographic location, which 
allows them to provide these services more easily. That may be one 
 64. See Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment 
Opportunities, supra note 20. For more information on underserved businesses, see 
generally OFF. OF THE ADVOC. FOR SMALL BUS. CAP. FORMATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 (2019). 
 65. See Anat Alon-Beck, The Coalition Model, A Private-Public Strategic 
Innovation Policy Model for Encouraging Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in 
the Era of New Economic Challenges, 17 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 267 (2018); 
see also Caroline A. Crenshaw, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on 
Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions (Nov. 2, 2020).  
 66. See infra Part III.  
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of the reasons why it is very difficult for startups that are located in 
areas that do not have technology clusters to obtain funding. How 
would the new rules help these startups? 
Second, underserved businesses may face significant bias that 
precludes them from raising capital. For example, startups led by 
women face significant bias that has made it difficult for them to 
attract funding from venture capitalists.67 Unfortunately, as noted 
by SEC Commissioner Caroline Crenshaw, the new rules do not 
address this problem.68 
Third, there is controversy over continuing the recent policy 
trend of expanding capital access via exempt offerings at the expense 
of protecting investors.69 This trend contributes to the rise in unicorn 
firms, which are already raising large amounts of capital from 
traditional VC investors and non-traditional AVC investors. 
Unicorns will be able to raise even more capital more frequently and 
with less restrictions thanks to these changes.70  
Critics also warn that there is no evidence that “good” private or 
public U.S. firms cannot attract capital from investors.71 The reality 
is that traditional investors in private markets, VCs and PEs, are 
already competing with non-traditional investors over investments 
in unicorn firms.72 
The following deepens the understanding of the ways in which 
firms, specifically startups, raise funding.  
 
   A. Early Stage Funding 
 
A firm, any firm, always desires or needs to raise capital, in 
order to grow, hire people, or to be able to invest in new projects. 
 67. See Crenshaw, supra note 65; see also Chloe Taylor, Over a Third of Female 
Entrepreneurs Experience Gender Bias, CNBC (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2019/10/03/hsbc-a-third-of-the-worlds-female-entrepreneurs-face-gender-bias.html; 
Why VCs Aren’t Funding Women, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 24, 2016), 
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/vcs-arent-funding-women-led-startups/. 
 68. See Crenshaw, supra note 65. 
 69. See infra Part II for a discussion on the JOBS Act.  
 70. See Crenshaw, supra note 65.  
 71. De Fontenay Written Statement, supra note 60, at 13. 
 72. It should be noted that there is a distinction between an innovation driven 
entrepreneurial firm and a small medium business enterprise. This Article will only 
address policy with regards to unicorns, which are large innovation driven 
enterprises. For more, see Alon-Beck, supra note 65; see also William Aulet & Fiona 
Murray, A Tale of Two Entrepreneurs: Understanding Differences in the Types of 
Entrepreneurship in the Economy (May 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2259740). 
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Differences exist, however, between small and medium enterprises 
(“SMEs”) and innovation driven enterprises (“IDEs”).73 Startups 
belong to the IDEs category because they concentrate on both local 
and global markets. IDEs are innovative because they adopt a new 
technology, process, or business model.  
For proper policy design, it is not enough to distinguish between 
SMEs and IDEs. We must also distinguish between different types of 
IDEs and their stages of funding: seed and early stage funding, late 
stage funding, and very late stage pre-IPO funding.  
Raising capital can be very different depending on the type of 
firm, stage, amounts of funding raised, and market conditions. An 
early stage startup, for example, usually experiences challenges in 
raising capital for the following reasons.74 The firm’s internal cash 
flow is not enough to support its needs.75 It cannot support the firm’s 
fast growing technology and research and development needs, which 
are comprised of intangible assets.76 If the firm is not able to obtain 
an injection of new capital, it will likely go bankrupt.77 This is not 
the case for the mature wealthy startup—the unicorn firm.78 The 
unicorn is a different beast!  
 
B. Late Stage and Very Late Stage Funding 
 
Raising large amounts of capital in late stage and very late stage 
financings is the new norm for a unicorn firm. Unicorns are not rare 
anymore. A new unicorn firm is born every four days.79 Thanks to 
investors that traditionally invested in public companies and now 
crossed over to invest in private markets, “private markets are the 
new public markets.”80   
The ability to raise large amounts of capital affects the unicorn 
firm. Unicorns are no longer dependent on an IPO (or trade sale) to 
 73. See Alon-Beck, supra note 65.  
 74. Ola Bengtsson & John R.M. Hand, CEO Compensation in Venture Capital 
Markets 2 (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1079993). 
 75. Id. at 6.  
 76. Id. at 7. 
 77. Id. at 18. 
 78. See supra note 4 for the features of a unicorn for purpose of this Article. See 
also How Unicorns Grow, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 28–30 (“Firms 
founded from 2012 to 2015 had a time to market cap more than twice that of firms 
founded from 2000 to 2003.”).  
 79. See Howie Xu, In Venture Capital, It’s Still the Age of the Unicorn, 
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 11, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/11/11/age-of-the-unicorn/.  
 80. Levine, supra note 2. 
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raise sufficient capital.81 Thanks to the changes in our securities 
laws, specifically, the expansions of exempt offerings in recent years, 
unicorn founders are now able to raise large amounts of money in 
mega deals, push their companies to stay private longer than eleven 
years,82 favor contractual “founder friendly” terms, and maintain 
control over the management of the firm.83  
Founders are able to gain such powers thanks to changes in the 
identity of the majority or controlling shareholders of late stage 
IDEs. To illustrate, if we compare the IPOs of “old” successful 
startups, such as Apple,84 Amazon,85 Google,86 or Facebook,87 and 
the IPOs of “new” unicorns, such as Uber, we will find many 
differences. These differences include valuations, growth periods, 
revenue expansions, timeline to IPO, and capital raising methods. 
One of the most striking differences between old and new startups is 
the change in the identity of their largest shareholder.  
In the past, the largest shareholder of a late stage startup would 
typically be a VC investor (or perhaps also a founder).88 Today, the 
largest shareholder of a unicorn startup can also be an AVC 
investor. The interest of these deep-pocketed AVC investors has 
reversed the competitive landscape of unicorn funding. Rather than 
 81. Brorsen, supra note 30; see MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 30; Lerner et al., 
supra note 30; Levine, supra note 2.  
 82. See Sungjoung Kwon et al., Mutual Fund Investments in Private Firms, 136 
J. FIN. ECON. 407, 425 (2020) (showing that these large amounts of capital “should 
enable the companies to stay private longer.”).  
 83. See infra Part II (discussing “founder friendly” terms). 
 84. See Alex Wilhelm, A Look Back in IPO: Apple, the Early PC Purveyor, 
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 15, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/15/a-look-back-in-ipo-
apple-the-early-pc-purveyor/. 
 85. Amazon’s IPO was in 1997. See Alex Wilhelm, A Look Back in IPO: 
Amazon’s 1997 Move, TECHCRUNCH (June 28, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/ 
2017/06/28/a-look-back-at-amazons-1997-ipo/.  
 86. Alex Wilhelm, A Look Back in IPO: Google, the Profit Machine, 
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 1, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/31/a-look-back-in-ipo-
google-the-profit-machine/. 
 87. Alex Wilhelm, A Look Back in IPO: Facebook’s Trailing Profit and Mobile 
Intrigue, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 22, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/22/a-look-
back-in-ipo-facebooks-trailing-profit-and-mobile-intrigue/. 
 88. Many have written on VCs’ exit at IPO. See, e.g., Christopher Barry et al., 
The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence from the 
Going Public Process, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 447 (1990); Paul A. Gompers, Grandstanding 
in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 133 (1996); Peggy M. Lee & Sunil 
Wahal, Grandstanding, Certification, and the Underpricing of Venture Capital 
Backed IPOs, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 375 (2004); William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. 
Weiss, Venture Capital Certification in Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 879 
(1991). 
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unicorn firms competing for a limited pool of funding, they are able 
to attract a nearly limitless pool of funds, leaving the deep-pockets to 
compete for the chance to invest.89  
This reversal substantially alters the governance structure of 
unicorns and the nature of the relationships between these 
companies and their investors.90 AVCs invest in late stage and very 
late stage IDEs and are very different from traditional VC 
investors.91 VC funds are special investment vehicles that provide 
financing to startup firms.92 VCs are an essential element of the U.S. 
national innovation system, which countries around the world 
extensively imitate.93  
The funding and support from a VC fund are of tremendous 
importance to a budding startup, not only because it provides the 
startup with cash,94 but also and more importantly because the VC 
managers provide services. These include mentoring and presenting 
the young company to networks of additional investors, potential 
acquirers, new partners, and customers.95 VC financing dominates 
the entrepreneurial finance literature96 due to the economic role that 
VCs play in reducing information costs.97 The following builds on 
this literature and sheds light on the new AVC investors.  
 89. For more information on the large amounts of “dry powder,” i.e., private 
capital that is looking for investments in private offerings, see BAIN & 
COMPANY, GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2020, at 11 (2020) (identifying more 
than $2.5 trillion in worldwide private equity “dry powder,” where more than half of 
this amount is attributable to North America); see also Crenshaw, supra note 65. 
 90. For more on the influence of the new AVC investor on the unicorn firm, as 
well as its current and future investors, see infra Part III. For an example of the 
WeWork and SoftBank relationship, see infra Part IV. SoftBank Group is a Japanese 
multi-national conglomerate headquartered in Tokyo, Japan.  
 91. For more on the difference between VCs and AVCs, see infra Part III.  
 92. See Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1163, 1169 (2013); John D. Morley, Why Do Investment Funds Have Special 
Securities Regulation?, (Yale L. & Econ., Research Paper, 2019), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3375450. VCs are private vehicles that can avoid complying with the 
Investment Company Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2012)).  
 93. See David H. Hsu & Martin Kenney, Organizing Venture Capital: The Rise 
and Demise of American Research & Development Corporation, 1946–1973, 14 INDUS. 
& CORP. CHANGE 579 (2005); Korsmo, supra note 92. 
 94. DAN SENOR & SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION: THE STORY OF ISRAEL’S 
ECONOMIC MIRACLE 161 (2009).  
 95. See infra note 164; see also Yael V. Hochberg et al., Networking as a Barrier 
to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture Capital, 65 J. FIN. 829 (2009); Laura 
Lindsey, Blurring Firm Boundaries: The Role of Venture Capital in Strategic 
Alliances, 63 J. FIN. 1137 (2008). 
 96. Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
717, 720 (2010). 
 97. See supra Part I.  
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The fact that the AVC investor might be the largest shareholder 
in a unicorn firm is not surprising since alternative investments in 
the U.S. market are up from around 40% a decade ago.98 It appears 
that there is an endless supply of private money from AVC investors, 
who are willing to line up to fund unicorns. To highlight the 
dramatic change in the market, note that the largest proportion of 
deals (almost 60%) in the VC industry in 2019 involved AVC 
investors.99  
In the past four years, at least one alternative investor has 
invested in the reported 2,000 completed VC financing rounds.100 
Furthermore, SoftBank, the Japanese telecom giant, which currently 
holds the largest tech investment fund in the market and in history, 
the $100 billion Vision Fund,101 is credited for pushing the deal sizes 
upwards.102 AVC investors play an important role in financing 
unicorns, and they need to be taken into account when making policy 
decisions on capital formation needs of startups.   
Currently, retail investors, researchers, and regulators do not 
have detailed information on the identity of the new AVC investors 
in our private markets, their incentives, their risk tolerance, the 
contractual terms that they negotiate, or other relevant data that 
would be helpful in understanding the new developments in the 
private markets. Part III below will analyze the interactions and 
relationships between the different investor groups in unicorn firms 
in order to understand the recent developments. But first, the 
following explores the recent regulatory developments that opened 
access to capital in private markets, which led to more investments 
by AVC investors.  
 98. PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, VENTURE MONITOR 27 (2019) 
[hereinafter PITCHBOOK NVCA 2019 REPORT]. 2018 marked the first year since the 
dot-com crisis of 2000 that annual investments in U.S. VC-backed firms surpassed 
$100 billion. Id. at 4. 
 99. Id. at 27. 
 100. Id. (“The average size of deals with tourist investor participation has 
surpassed $43 million during the past two years, a $15 million jump over any year 
prior”). 
 101. Sam Shead, Silicon Valley VCs Are Being Pressured into Raising Big New 
Funds by the Size of SoftBank, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/sequoias-reportedly-raising-a-new-6-billion-fund-
2017-12. SoftBank is actively fundraising for its Vision Fund 2 from new players 
such as Apple Inc. and Microsoft Corp.  
 102. PITCHBOOK NVCA 2019 REPORT, supra note 98, at 27 (“not only because of 
the 50 mega-deals the firm has contributed to since 2015, but also because the 
competitors of its portfolio companies have been forced to cut larger checks in 
response.”). 
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C. Improving Access to Capital in Private Markets 
 
In order to improve access to capital in private markets, the SEC 
recently adopted amendments to harmonize and improve the 
“patchwork” exempt offering framework. It is important to 
acknowledge the need to harmonize the current complex offering 
framework and to give the SEC credit for trying to simplify it.103  
According to our federal and state securities laws, any offer or 
sale of securities is subject to registration unless there are 
exemptions from registration.104 Registered offerings are subject to 
comprehensive disclosure requirements,105 higher compliance costs, 
and provide access to a broad group of potential investors.106  
It is also important to note that this is not the first time that the 
SEC is expanding exemptions from registration requirements. This 
is part of a series of reforms to the federal securities laws, which 
began about fifteen years ago,107 in order to provide exemptions from 
the old registration requirements.108  
The primary congressional enactments that allowed companies 
to use exemptions are the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 
2012 (“JOBS Act”), the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act 
of 2015 (the “FAST Act”) and the Economic Growth, Regulatory 
Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (the “Economic Growth 
Act”).109  
 103. This Article does not discuss the changes to Regulation Crowdfunding. 
Moreover, it applauds the SEC for strengthening investor protections under 
Regulation Crowdfunding.  
 104. There is a debate on whether it contributed to the reduction of information 
asymmetry and agency costs. See Darian Ibrahim, Public or Private Venture Capital, 
94 WASH. L. REV. 1137, 1144 (2019) (“Mandatory disclosure reduces the costs of 
acquiring information by forcing corporations to release it to the markets at pre-set 
times”); see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of 
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 716, 738 (2006).  
 105. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency 
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1076 (1995).  
 106. See EVA SU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45221, CAPITAL MARKETS, SECURITIES 
OFFERINGS, AND RELATED POLICY ISSUES 3 (2018). 
 107. See Statement of Renee Jones, supra note 4. 
 108. Id.  
 109. For more on these Acts, see Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options, supra note 
4; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 38. The other 
legislative enactments are: (1) the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, which includes 
modernizing the Regulation D offering process and creates the “venture exchanges”; 
(2) The CROWDFUND Act, title III of the JOBS Act, which, through agency 
rulemaking, allows companies to use a crowdfunding platform (intermediary) for 
raising small amounts of equity capital (less than $1 million annually) from 
potentially large pools of investors over the internet, see Joan M. Heminway, 
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The intention and rationale behind the JOBS Act was to 
facilitate the emerging growth companies’ “access to the public 
capital markets.”110 The JOBS Act reduced SOX regulatory 
requirements in the hopes of encouraging private companies to go 
public.111 However, the JOBS Act’s biggest achievement was “radical 
deregulation.”112 The exemption allowed private firms to keep 
material information private longer, as they are now required to 
disclose according to the federal periodic disclosure requirements.113 
Thanks to the JOBS Act, the threshold that triggered registration 
with the SEC has changed.114  
These changes are balanced due to the tension between capital 
formation needs and investor protection. A private placement 
(private offering or unregistered offering) is an offering of securities 
to potential investors, which is exempt from registration with the 
SEC and is not subject to broad disclosure requirements.  
Securities Crowdfunding and Investor Protection (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Stud., 
Working Paper No. 292, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2810757; and (3) title IV of the JOBS Act, which provides for new 
Regulation A exemptions (commonly referred to as “Reg A+”) that increased a 
private company’s ability to make unregistered public offerings to a maximum of $50 
million to the public in any twelve-month period. 
 110. See Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3389 (2013); Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Rewarding the 
Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
1573 (2013); see also Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs 
Gone? The Hard Life of the Small IPO, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 84 (2016); Usha 
Rodrigues, The JOBS Act at Work, CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 11, 2015), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/jobs-act/ (criticizing the JOBS Act’s unrealistic 
endeavors to boost IPOs). 
 111. According to Rose and Solomon, “The JOBS Act is primarily a response to 
the regulatory theory, but also takes some aims towards market structure by 
loosening restrictions on research analysts.” Rose & Solomon, supra note 110, at 85. 
 112. See Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. Of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 
112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Senate Hearing, Examining Investor Risks]; see also 
Michael D. Gutentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the 
Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 175 (2013).  
 113. See Gutentag, supra note 112, at 152. 
 114. “[T]he JOBS Act related changes affecting the private market may be more 
significant[:] Title V and Title VI changes to the Exchange Act Section 12(g) 
threshold[,] Changes to Rule 506[, and] Legal certainty for matchmaking platforms.” 
Susan Mac Cormack et al., Morrison & Foerster LLP, Presentation at Late Stage 
Financing Sessions: Late Stage Private Placements 3 (Apr. 26–27, 2016) 
(presentation slides available at https://media2.mofo.com/documents/160426 
latestagefinancings.pdf). For more, see generally ANNA PINEDO, MORRSION & 
FOERSTER, FOLLOWING THE WISDOM OF THE CROWD? A LOOK AT THE SEC’S FINAL 
CROWDFUNDING RULES (2015). 
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The Securities Act provides a number of exemptions from 
registration.115 Investors most frequently use exemptions from 
registration applicable to private placements that are contained in 
Section 506, under Regulation D of the Securities Act.116 According 
to a concept release by the SEC,117 in 2018, companies raised $1,500 
billion using Rule 506(b) of Regulation D, 118 and $211 billion using 





Amounts Reported or Estimated as 
Raised in 2018  
Rule 506(b) of Regulation D  $1,500 billion  
Rule 506(c) of Regulation D  $211 billion  
Regulation A: Tier 1  $0.061 billion  
Regulation A: Tier 2  $0.675 billion  
Rule 504 of Regulation D  $2 billion  
Regulation Crowdfunding; 
Section 4(a)(6)  
$0.055 billion  
Other exempt offerings  $1,200 billion  
 
Source: Concept Release on Harmonization, supra note 39, at 30462. 
 
As indicated in the above chart, Rule 506(b) is most commonly 
used by investors that rely on exemptions from registration. It is so 
popular that, according to the Small Business Advocate Annual 
Report, in 2019, “Rule 506(b) exemptions raised more money than 
was raised by all U.S. public offerings.”119  
 115. Section 3 of the Securities Act identifies classes of securities that are 
exempt from the registration requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2018). Section 4 of the 
Securities Act identifies a number of transactions that are exempt from the 
registration requirements. Id. § 77d. Both public and private companies can use 
unregistered offerings (private placements) to raise funds from investors. This 
Article will focus on offerings made by private companies and their investors. 
 116. See Rule 506 of Regulation D, INVESTOR.GOV: U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-rule506htm.html (last updated Nov. 27, 
2017); see also Abraham J. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities 
Regulations Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 132 (2010); 
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) 
Consequences for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BUS. L.J. 287, 295 (2012); Ibrahim, supra note 104, at 1162.  
 117. See Table 1. 
 118. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2016). 
 119. See Crenshaw, supra note 65. 
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As part of the effort to harmonize the complex disclosure regime, 
the SEC changed the financial information that must be provided to 
non-accredited investors under Rule 506(b) in order to align it with 
offerings under Regulation A. This change removes the audit 
requirement in a Rule 506(b) offering of up to $20 million with 
regards to non-accredited investors to align it with a Regulation A 
Tier 1 offering, which does not require audits of financial 
statements.  
The idea behind the change is to encourage the participation of 
non-accredited investors in Rule 506(b) offerings. Prior to the 
change,  
506(b) issuers might have had no incentive or interest to offer and 
sell securities to any non-accredited investors due to the expensive 
disclosure requirements and the fact that they are permitted to offer 
to no more than 35 non-accredited investors. Time will tell whether 
this change will encourage more participation of non-accredited 
investors or not.  
It should be noted that the CFA Institute raised the concern that 
there are some problems with the change due to the fundamental 
differences between the regulations. Issuers using the new Rule 
506(b) offerings to non-accredited investors will be required to 
disclose unaudited financial statements as long as the offering 
amount is below $20 million. If the Rule 506(b) offering is above $20 
million, issuers will be required to make the disclosures according to 
Article 8 of Regulation S-X instead of the disclosures required in a 
registration statement.  
The CFA Institute objects to aligning the regulations because 
Rule 506(b) offerings and Regulation A Tier 1 are different 
regulations that were traditionally designed to protect investors. 
Regulation A Tier 1 (and Regulation Crowdfunding) provides 
additional protections to non-accredited investors, which Rule 506(b) 
does not. In a Regulation A offering, the issuer files an offering 
statement with the SEC. The SEC reviews the offering statement 
and decides whether to declare that it is “qualified.” Only after the 
offering statement has been qualified by the SEC may issuers begin 
selling securities. These “differences amplify the need for the current 
audit requirement in certain 506(b) offerings.”120  
The CFA Institute emphasized in their comment letter to the 
SEC that audited financial statements are incredibly important for 
investor protection and further quoted SEC Chief Accountant Sagar 
 120. Letter from James C. Allen & Stephen Dean to Vanessa Countryman, supra 
note 60; Crenshaw, supra note 65.  
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Teotia to support their claim: “As Chairman Clayton has 
emphasized, audited financial statements are the bedrock of our 
financial reporting system. High-quality financial statements, 
prepared in accordance with a framework developed by independent 
standard setters, provide relevant and reliable information to 
investors.”121  
The SEC’s intention and rationale behind this change is to 
harmonize the current framework and facilitate access of non-
accredited investors to the private capital markets. Therefore, they 
reduced the regulatory requirements under Rule 506(b) in the hopes 
of simplifying the current offering framework and encouraging 
private placement offerings to non-accredited investors.  
Some critics may argue that this policy continues the JOBS Act’s 
trend of “radical deregulation,”122 and that this change may hurt the 
non-accredited investor’s ability to make an informed investment 
decision. As noted above, there are differences between Regulation D 
and Regulation A where Regulation A provides more protections.  
Others might disagree due to the limited number of non-
accredited investors that may be involved in a Rule 506(b) private 
placement and the fact that these investors will get financial 
statement information, albeit unaudited, as well as non-financial 
statement information.  
Finally, this Article argues that large issuers, such as unicorn 
firms, should be required to be audited by an independent auditor 
before issuing securities to non-accredited purchasers. If a company 
is raising money at a billion-dollar valuation, the cost of such an 
audit should not be overly burdensome. These disclosures can 
improve efficiency, reduce information asymmetries, and produce 
increasingly equitable and sustainable participation of all investors 
in unicorn firms.  
In any event, one thing is clear: The SEC is taking more actions 
to encourage investor participation in private markets. The SEC 
continues the policy trend that encourages issuers to raise large 
amounts of capital using private placements as is evident from the 
new amendments to the integration rules, which will allow issuers to 
access more capital more easily and efficiently.  
 121. Sagar Teotia, Chief Acct., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement in 
Connection with the 2019 AICPA Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB 
Developments (Dec. 9, 2019).  
 122. See Senate Hearing, Examining Investor Risks, supra note 112; see also 
Gutentag, supra note 112.  
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To illustrate, the SEC established a new integration framework 
that replaced the prior five-factor integration test.123 It shortened 
the integration safe harbor under Regulation D to a thirty-day 
integration safe harbor, despite concern by critics that this policy 
might encourage more fraud and Ponzi schemes.124 It also adopted a 
number of safe harbors in new Rule 152(b), which will make it easier 
for issuers to raise capital.125  
The SEC’s expansion of the exempt offering framework increases 
the risks to retail investors and also decreases the information 
available to investors in general. The following explains the 
potential risks to potential investors due to illiquidity. It supports 
the argument that the SEC must improve investor protections for 
the new investor groups that will be eligible to invest in private 
markets thanks to these changes.  
 123. See SEC Simplifies the Exempt Offering Framework, MCGUIREWOODS 
(Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/Alerts/2020/11/sec-
simplifies-the-exempt-offering-framework. 
 124. It should be noted that some critics object to this change. See Letter from 
Christine Lazaro & Samuel Edwards to Vanessa Countryman, supra note 21 
(“Private placements are often heavily marketed through independent broker-dealer 
networks and are ‘sold, not bought.’ Financial professionals push these products to 
unsophisticated investors—those same investors do not beg their advisors for access 
to non-public investments. PIABA’s members see the investments presented as 
alternative income investments appealing to elderly investors often living on a fixed 
income. Unscrupulous financial advisors pitch the products as offering income higher 
than what is available in conventional fixed-income securities, and/or also providing 
diversification to the investor’s portfolio because their value is not correlated to the 
stock market or other conventional asset classes. Many clients solicited to invest in 
these types of products end up losing their entire investment.”).  
 125. For more analysis on the new changes, see DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, SEC 
EASES RULES GOVERNING PRIVATE PLACEMENTS (2020); see also Facilitating Capital 
Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities, supra note 20.  
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D. Private Markets and Illiquidity 
 
One of the main problems with opening access to private 
markets is the illiquidity associated with private investments. For 
example, unicorn shares are non-liquid financial assets. Whether 
there is an active market to trade these securities or not depends on 
the bargaining power of the investor and the share purchase 
agreement that she signed. Certain unicorns may allow some of their 
investors to trade their shares on secondary trading markets, but 
the reality is that many unicorns put restrictions on these practices 
and do not allow trading in order to assure compliance with our 
securities laws.  
Historically, regulations limited the exit mechanism for investors 
in private firms to an IPO or a trade sale.126 Private company 
investors therefore dealt with extreme “lock-in” of their capital due 
to the illiquidity of their stock. 127 Due to the prolonged timeline to 
IPO or trade sale, which is now longer than eleven years,128 
companies developed new liquidity practices to allow unicorn 
shareholders, such as powerful early investors (sometimes also 
employees), to liquidate their investments as an alternative to the 
traditional exit mechanisms.129  
These new practices include secondary sales, structured liquidity 
programs (private tender offers), and other liquidity alternatives.130 
Existing shareholders (investors and employees) often use them as a 
 126. See Jesse M. Fried & Brian J. Broughman, Do Founders Control Start-Up 
Firms That Go Public? (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 
405/2018, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171237. 
 127. The private startup company legal form is set to “lock-in parties while 
developing vulnerable match-specific assets.” See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. 
Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority 
Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 919 (1999). This Article builds 
on the work of Rock and Wachter and postulates that capital lock-in is important for 
startup companies, including large unicorns, because the cost of investing in 
innovation-driven products or services is very high and risky.   
 128. The timeline to IPO used to be four years and is now longer than eleven 
years. See JAY RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: UPDATED STATISTICS 12 (2020).  
 129. See Katie Roof, SoftBank’s Big Investment in Uber Comes to a Close, 
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 28, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/28/softbanks-big-
investment-in-uber-comes-to-a-close/; see also Greg Bensinger & Liz Hoffman, 
SoftBank Succeeds in Tender Offer for Large Stake in Uber: Group Led by Japanese 
firm Is Set to Acquire About 18% of Startup at a Steep Discount, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-succeeds-in-tender-offer-for-large-stake-
in-uber-1514483283. 
 130. See DAWN BELT, PRE-IPO LIQUIDITY FOR LATE STAGE START-UPS 1 (2018). 
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third exit option.131 They involve specific contractual arrangements 
between the various participants. These investors have divergent 
rights and privileges as explained in further detail below. 
Many unicorn firms develop new liquidity alternatives because of 
the desire of the founder to push the company to stay private longer, 
which is now longer than eleven years.132 The development of new 
dynamic secondary markets makes it easier for AVC investors to 
invest in private unicorn firms.133 Would non-accredited investors be 
able to bargain for such opportunities?  
It should be noted that historically secondary transactions were 
common in the private equity industry but not within the VC 
industry.134 It is also important to note that the new liquidity 
practices, such as the secondary sales, structured liquidity programs 
(private tender offers), and other liquidity alternatives,135 were 
designed to allow the powerful accredited unicorn shareholders to 
liquidate their investments as an alternative to the traditional exit 
mechanisms.136  
These alternative exit mechanisms facilitate the participation of 
AVC investors that traditionally invested in public markets and 
induce them to invest in private markets. As noted, they also allow 
founders to continue to maintain control137 over the management of 
their company.138 For proper policy design on expanding exempt 
 131. See Ibrahim, supra note 104.  
 132. The timeline to IPO used to be four years and is now longer than eleven 
years. RITTER, supra note 128, at 12. 
 133. There are several distinctions between secondary and primary markets. 
First, in the primary market, the company issues securities (stock or bonds) for the 
first time directly to investors. If the investors then sell the securities to a third 
party, then these transactions occur on the secondary markets. Second, the proceeds 
from the sale of securities on the primary market go to the issuing company. 
Whereas the proceeds from the sale of securities on secondary markets go to the 
selling investor and not the company that initially issued the stock. Family offices 
and angel investors are not going to get much attention in this Article. 
 134. Chirag Modi, Venture Capital Funding Trends & The Emergence of 
Secondary Funds, MEDIUM (Jan. 13, 2019), https://medium.com/@cmodi/venture-
capital-funding-trends-the-emergence-of-secondary-funds-1b615e92372d. 
 135. See BELT, supra note 130.  
 136. See Roof, supra note 129; see also Bensinger & Hoffman, supra note 129. 
 137. Nicolas Grabar et al., A Look Under the Hood of Spotify’s Direct Listing, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/26/a-look-under-the-hood-of-spotifys-direct-
listing/. 
 138. Before direct listing, tech founders used dual class stock. For more on dual 
class stock and “minority controlling shareholders” see Lucien A. Bebchuk & Kobi 
Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 
594–95 (2017). For a detailed account of the history of dual-class structures in the 
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offerings, capital formation, and investor protection, it is important 
to shed light on the operations of AVC investors.  
The following introduces the AVC investors and the ways in 
which they are investing in startups, as compared to the traditional 
VC investors. 
 
III. INVESTOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE MARKETS  
 
Over the last thirty years, academic literature has focused on 
VCs as the main source of financing for private startups.139 There is 
no agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a VC fund.140 A VC 
firm is a type of investment vehicle that invests in startups. VCs are 
repeat players in the startup world that use unique contracts and 
organizational capabilities in order to overcome uncertainty, risk, 
information asymmetry, agency,141 “lemons,” and “adverse 
selection”142 related problems. VC financing has prevailed since the 
early days of commercial activity in various forms.143  
United States, see Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: 
The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 693–707 
(1986). For new legislation authorizing dual class listings, see NYSE Listed Co. 
Manual § 313.00 (permitting the issuance of multiple classes prior to the IPO); see 
also Press Release, Council of Institutional Invs., Institutional Investors Oppose 
Stitch Fix Dual-Class Structure but Welcome Sunset Provision (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://advisornews.com/oarticle/institutional-investors-oppose-stitch-fix-dual-class-
structure-but-welcome-sunset-provision#.W-TKzZNKjIU. See generally Effectiveness 
of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Revisions and Restructuring of the NASDAQ 
Listing Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59663, 74 Fed. Reg. 15552 (Apr. 6, 
2009). 
 139. See Gompers, supra note 88.  
 140. See Korsmo, supra note 92. 
 141. See LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB & PHILLIP E. AUERSWALD, BETWEEN INVENTION 
AND INNOVATION: AN ANALYSIS OF FUNDING FOR EARLY-STAGE TECHNOLOGY 
DEVELOPMENT 35–38 (2002); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11; see also PAUL 
GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 129 (1999). For further 
discussion on agency problems and strategies to reduce them, see Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 11.  
 142. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 83 Q. J. ECON. 488, 493 (1970); see also GOMPERS & LERNER, 
supra note 141, at 129; Utset, supra note 32, at 56.  
 143. For the purpose of this Article, a VC fund is a qualified fund under the 
Investment Company Act or the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer 
Protection Act. The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection 
Act was signed by President Trump on May 24, 2018. It “expands the Section 3(c)(1) 
exclusion under the Investment Company Act to allow up to 250 beneficial owners of 
smaller venture capital funds. A venture capital or other fund may still rely on the 
traditional Section 3(c)(1) exclusion.” New Law Creates New Venture Capital Fund 
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A. VC Investor Access to Private Markets 
 
The VC industry has played and continues to play an important 
role in the U.S. innovation process. The founder of the VC industry 
is Georges Doriot. Doriot was a Harvard Business Professor,144 who 
established the first public VC firm - American Research and 
Development Corporation (“ARD”), after World War II. 145 ARD 
made history when it turned an equity investment of $70,000 into 
$355 million. ARD invested in Digital Equipment Corporation 
(“DEC”), and that investment made ARD $355 million after DEC did 
an IPO in 1968.146  
ARD was the first institutional private investment firm that 
accepted money from new sources. The ARD legal structure is no 
longer popular today and has even led to its demise,147 but its initial 
success influenced the design of and development of modern VC 
investment finance.148  
VC investors are unique and distinct from other types of 
investors. VCs are different from retail or other institutional 
investors that invest in public companies. As noted by Korsmo, “VCs 
diverge sharply from the typical conception of the stockholder in a 
public corporation.”149 VCs are active investors (not passive), who 
provide many value-added services to the companies that they invest 
in.150 VC investors also get credit for spurring more technological 
innovation than other investors.151  
VCs are also different from AVC investors. Below is an 
explanation on the ways in which modern VCs are structured and 
run, as compared to AVC investors. The Article explores whether 
Exemption Under Investment Company Act of 1940, JDSUPRA (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-law-creates-new-venture-capital-77279/. 
 144. SPENCER E. ANTE, CREATIVE CAPITAL: GEORGES DORIOT AND THE BIRTH OF 
VENTURE CAPITAL xiii (2008); see also Korsmo, supra note 92. 
 145. ANTE, supra note 144.  
 146. American Research Development Corporation, 1946, ENTREPRENEURIAL 
MIT, http://museum.mit.edu/150/78 (last visited Dec. 24, 2020). 
 147. Hsu & Kenney, supra note 93.  
 148. See Korsmo, supra note 92. 
 149. Id. 
 150. For further information on services provided by VCs, see GOMPERS & 
LERNER, supra note 141. Such services can vary, and include: strategic planning, 
mentoring, guidance, selecting management, lawyers, accountants, writing a 
business plan, etc. 
 151. See Samuel S. Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture 
Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674 (2000); see also Joseph Bankman & 
Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289 (1999) (reviewing tax 
treatment of startups). 
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AVC investors use the same legal structure and investment 
mechanisms as VC investors? If not, what are the differences 
between the investor groups? This comparison will shed light on the 
ways in which AVCs affect the innovation ecosystem, especially with 
regards to access to capital. 
Depending on their corporate purpose and objective, AVC 
investors use different legal structures to invest in unicorns. The 
legal structures range from investment as an active general partner 
(“GP”) that manages the investments or a passive limited partner 
(“LP”) that simply invests capital using a separate fund structure; 
co-investment alongside a VC, using a GP or LP fund structure; 
purchasing shares indirectly through secondary markets; or direct 
investments in the issuer (unicorn firm). 
The following chart illustrates the typical VC fund structure. 
Table 2. VC Fund Structure.
Source:  Adapted by author from: Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty:  
Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2008).   
The following introduces the new players. It compares AVC and 
traditional VC investors.  
2020]  ALTERNATIVE VENTURE CAPITAL 1017 
 
B. AVC Investor Access to Private Markets 
 
1. Corporate Venture Capital 
 
Alternative investment vehicles, which economists refer to as 
“corporate venture capital or CVC”152, are aggressively investing in 
unicorn firms. Last year, startups in the United States raised over 
$41.2 billion from CVC investors, according to data from the 
financial research company PitchBook.153 What is a CVC? 
A CVC investment is an equity investment of an established 
firm, such as a corporation, in an external independent startup 
firm.154 Large firms typically use CVC investments in order to 
compete in an ever-changing technology market where new 
technologies and business models constantly disrupt their existing 
businesses.155 CVC programs are very popular today. More than 
1,600 corporations have CVC programs worldwide, including Google 
Ventures (GV)156 and Microsoft’s M12.157  
The phenomenon of CVC investments in startups is not new. 
Large firms established CVC arms before. In the past, however, 
many of the CVC investment efforts usually ended up in dissolution 
 152. See also David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, The U.S. National 
Innovation System, in NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
29 (Richard Nelson ed., 1993). 
 153. Joshua Mayers, A Senior CVC Investment Professional Makes How Much?, 
PITCHBOOK (Nov. 27, 2018), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/a-senior-cvc-
investment-professional-makes-how-much. 
 154. See Gary Dushnitsky, Corporate Venture Capital in the 21st Century: An 
Integral Part of Firms’ Innovation Toolkit, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF VENTURE 
CAPITAL 156, 157 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012); Henry W. Chesbrough, Making 
Sense of Corporate Venture Capital, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 2002), https://hbr.org/ 
2002/03/making-sense-of-corporate-venture-capital/ar/1.  
 155. See Dushnitsky, supra note 154, at 165.  
 156. GV invests “in companies across a broad range of industries, including 
consumer internet, software, hardware, clean-tech, bio-tech and health care. It 
invests amounts ranging from seed funding to tens of millions of dollars, depending 
on the stage of the opportunity and the company's need for capital. Also, Google has 
limited its focus to companies in North America.” See Google Ventures, CBINSIGHTS, 
https://www.cbinsights.com/investor/google-ventures (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).  
 157. See M12, CBINSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/investor/microsoft-
ventures (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). According to the THELANDER-PITCHBOOK 
report, more than half of the CVCs were created since 2010. BELL MASON GRP. & J. 
THELANDER CONSULTING, THELANDER 2017 CVC COMPENSATION REPORT – BMG 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (2017).  
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or failure of the CVC arm.158 There are significant differences 
between an investment by a CVC vehicle and a traditional VC, 
which perhaps can help explain the reasons for the previous failure 
stories.159
The following compares VC and CVC models, including legal 
formation, incentive structures, and compensation of CVC investors. 
Table 3. A traditional CVC Fund structure. 
Source: Holger Ernst et al., Corporate Venture Capital as a Strategy 
for External Innovation: An Exploratory Empirical Study, 35 R&D
MGMT. 233, 234 (2005).
    a. Corporate Venture Capital & Comparison to Venture Capital 
There are many differences between VC and CVC investment 
vehicles.160 First, and foremost, the VC manages its fund from a 
return-on-investment stance, whereas the CVC manager is required 
158. Joseph A. McCahery et al., Corporate Venture Capital: From Venturing to 
Partnering, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF VENTURE CAPITAL 211, 218 (Douglas 
Cumming ed., 2012).
159. Id. at 219. 
160. See Rita Waite, Corporate VC vs VC: Corporate Venture Capital’s Priorities 
Differ From Institutional VCs, CBINSIGHTS (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporate-venture-capital-institutional-venture-
capital/.
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to successfully achieve a blend of financial and strategic goals.161 
VCs mainly invest for financial purposes, whereas CVCs might have 
other strategic purposes.162  
In the event that the corporation has difficulty with directing its 
CVC arm on the objectives of the potential investment, for example, 
whether it values more financial returns versus accomplishments of 
strategic goals, then the CVCs will be inclined to not follow through 
and pull the plug on the investment.163 For example, this might 
occur in cases where the CVC is not invested in order to acquire or 
get access to the complementary technology that the startup is 
developing.164 Additionally, CVCs do not enjoy the same kind of 
longevity that VCs enjoy; their lifespan is significantly shorter and 
much more volatile.165   
Second, typically most large corporations do not have the “VC-
like” dedication to their portfolio companies, or the expertise to deal 
with such investment.166 According to an Ernst and Young study,167 
large corporations do not typically select the investment 
opportunities on their own; rather, they piggyback and form 
syndicates with renowned VC funds in order to select the startups.168  
The corporate objective and type of technology also matters. 
There is a difference between CVCs that invest in competing or 
complementary technologies. There is a negative spillover effect 
when the established firm invests in a startup that has a competing 
(or adjacent) technology.169 Empirically, in cases with direct 
competition between the startup and the CVC’s firm, the startup 
retains more board seats for itself and is reluctant to award board 
power to the CVC investors.170 Strategically, however, CVC investors 
might be more interested in investing in competing technologies 
 161. ERNST & YOUNG, GLOBAL CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL SURVEY 2008–09, 
BENCHMARKING PROGRAMS AND PRACTICES 6 (2009); see also BELL MASON GRP. & J. 
THELANDER CONSULTING, supra note 157. 
 162. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 161, at 6. 
 163. CVCs are more dependent on the ongoing sponsorship of their corporate 
owners, because the sponsors can abandon the CVC without due cause and for 
reasons that are utterly removed from the operations of the CVC fund itself. See 
McCahery et al., supra note 158, at 219.  
 164. Id. at 221. 
 165. Id. at 219.  
 166. See id.  
 167. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 161, at 8. 
 168. Id.  
 169. See McCahery et al., supra note 158, at 219.  
 170. Ronald W. Masulis & Rajarishi Nahata, Financial Contracting with 
Strategic Investors: Evidence from Corporate Venture Capital Backed IPOs, 18 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 599, 601 (2009); see also McCahery et al., supra note 158, at 219. 
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even though the CVC will conceivably be more successful with 
investments in complementary technologies.171  
Third, the governance structures, compensation, and other 
incentive mechanisms of CVC vehicles are distinctive from VCs. For 
example, CVCs are not always efficient in incentivizing the division 
managers to maximize profits.172 The choice of legal structure also 
affects the fund manager’s incentives, as follows.  
The large firm’s decision to use a subsidiary structure for the 
CVC, rather than a limited partnership (which is used by traditional 
VC), makes a significant difference.173 GPs in a VC limited 
partnership usually have an incentive to maximize profits, whereas 
managers of a subsidiary of the CVC are usually characterized by 
risk-averse behavior.174 A contributing factor is the structure of 
management performance fees.175 VCs are experts in tying a 
manager’s salary to her performance,176 whereas in many cases 
CVCs do not tie the manager’s performance to her salary (instead 
the manager fee is included in the corporate fee-structure plans).177 
That is why many CVCs experience the revolving door problem, 
where senior managers frequently leave.178   
Fourth, investment strategies differ with regard to 
specialization, diversification, and timing.179 CVC funds are 
traditionally less diversified and encompass a narrow ground of 
operation (specialization) as their spheres are essentially determined 
by the parent company’s operations.180 
If, for any reason, the CVC fund decided not to partake in 
subsequent financing rounds, they could transform their investment 
from a strategic participation into a mere financial investment.181 
 171. See McCahery et al., supra note 158, at 219.  
 172. See id.  
 173. See id.  
 174. See id.  
 175. See id. 
 176. A manager’s salary is tied to performance by frequently offering 1–2% fixed 
fees plus 20% fund profits. See id.  
 177. According to McCahery et al., for this reason, top fund management talent 
is repeatedly recruited to profitable VC funds and away from successful CVC funds. 
See id. 
 178. See BELL MASON GRP. & J. THELANDER CONSULTING, supra note 157.  
 179. See McCahery et al., supra note 158, at 220. 
 180. Additionally, unlike VCs, CVCs managers sometimes do not allow 
entrepreneurs to use their preferred IPO exit. Rather the managers control the 
terms of the exit strategy by using the drag-along and redemption . According to 
McCahery et al., the evidence confirms that VC investment returns tend to be higher 
than those of CVC funds. See id. at 220.  
 181. See id. 
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The existence of “pay-to-play provisions” (provisions that punish 
investors that do not participate in their full pro-rata percentage of 
the financing) could oblige the CVC fund to convert their preferred 
shares into common shares, essentially forfeiting their privileges.182  
The participation of CVC investors affects the private ordering 
between VC investors and founders by allowing the founders to 
demand founder-friendly investment rounds.183 They not only 
contribute to the changes in contractual terms in the traditional VC 
financing documents but can also lead to conflicts of interest.184  
CVCs can also have different models. SoftBank provides an 
example. SoftBank’s model departs from the traditional CVC model. 
Most CVC funds are accountable only to their parent corporation’s 
strategic desires because they rely on the parent corporation for 
funding. SoftBank, however, has recently been raising money from 
outside investors.185 It is deploying outside money with its own 
capital, and perhaps takes other interests into account.186 Therefore, 
this Article will address the SoftBank Phenomenon separately 
below.187    
 
b. SoftBank & Comparison to Venture Capital 
 
About three years ago, SoftBank started raising money for its 
$100 billion Vision Fund.188 Due to its extra-large size and 
 182. See generally id. at 220–23. 
 183. Id.  
 184. See Fan, supra note 4. 
 185. See Arash Massoudi et al., Softbank’s Son Uses Rare Structure for $93bn 
Tech Fund, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/b6fe313a-4add-
11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43. 
 186. Id.; see also Taylor Hatmaker, Apple Joins SoftBank’s Vision Fund with $1 
Billion Investment, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 4, 2017),  
https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/04/apple-joins-softbanks-vision-fund-with-1-billion-
investment/; Jason Rowley, How SoftBank’s $100B Fund Is in a League All Its Own, 
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 9, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/09/how-softbanks-100b-
fund-is-in-a-league-all-its-own/; Sam Shead, Japan's SoftBank Has Raised $1 Billion 
from Sharp for Its Colossal $100 Billion Tech Fund, BUS. INSIDER (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/softbank-vision-fund-sharp-2017-5. 
 187. It should be noted that there are different types of CVCs. This Article is 
referring to the common CVC unit structure, which is part of the main entity. The 
CVC arm draws money directly from the parent company on a yearly basis, which 
includes a dedicated team and operating budget. Other CVCs operate separately 
than the parent corporation “as a completely separate entity (16%) or (ii) through an 
LLC or off-balance sheet with an annual investment budget (26%). Only 17% rely on 
obtaining investment funds from the parent company on an ad hoc, case-by-case 
basis.” BELL MASON GRP. & J. THELANDER CONSULTING, supra note 157, at 5. 
 188. See Shead, supra note 186. 
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aggressive mega-deals,189 Vision Fund has been making headlines 
ever since.190 Vision Fund is much larger than “any other tech fund 
on the planet.”191 The fund is backed by both internal and external 
investors, including Apple, Sharp, and Saudi Arabia's PIF SWF.192  
SoftBank is changing the private ordering arrangements 
between VC firms and startups.193 The question is: How pervasive is 
the disruption? SoftBank’s late stage mega deals not only provide 
unicorns with large amounts of capital for capital formation and 
growth but also transform the U.S. VC world.194 In order to compete 
with SoftBank’s mega deals of $100 million or more, many U.S. VC 
funds are either syndicating, raising large amounts of capital, or 
breaking up.195 
SoftBank’s Vision Fund (“SVF”) has a complex fund structure, 
which some compare to being structured like a VC fund but others 
compare to a PE fund.196 As noted, PE and VC funds both invest in 
startups, but there are several differences between them. The main 
one is that PEs invest using cash and debt whereas VCs typically 
invest using equity.197 It is clear that the SVF’s structure is also 
different due to the following reasons. According to reports, the fund 
managers are compensated using management fees and carried 
 189. See generally id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Shead, supra note 101. 
 192. In late 2018, TechCrunch had reported that “the sovereign fund of Saudia 
Arabia plans to invest $45 billion into the second SoftBank Vision Fund, two years 
after putting the same amount into the original $100 billion Vision Fund.” Catherine 
Shu, Saudi Arabia’s Sovereign Fund Will also Invest $45B in SoftBank’s Second 
Vision Fund, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 8, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/07/saudi-
arabias-sovereign-fund-will-also-invest-45b-in-softbanks-second-vision-fund. 
According to SoftBank, the LPs include: SoftBank Group Corp., Public Investment 
Fund, Mubadala Investment Company, Apple, Foxconn Technology Group, 
Qualcomm Incorporated, and Sharp Corporation. Press Release, SoftBank Grp., 
SoftBank Vision Fund’s First Major Closing (May 22, 2017), 
https://group.softbank/en/news/press/20170522. 
 193. See Nathaniel Popper et al., The SoftBank Effect: How $100 Billion Left 
Workers in a Hole, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/ 
technology/softbank-startups.html. 
 194. Andy White & Anthony Mirhaydari, Visualizing SoftBank’s Epic Reach, 
PITCHBOOK (July 23, 2018), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/visualizing-
softbanks-epic-reach. 
 195. See Shead, supra note 101.  
 196. Dan Primack, The Complicated Future of SoftBank Vision Fund, AXIOS 
(Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.axios.com/softbank-vision-fund-complicated-future-
0c89673d-7850-47de-8a52-cb49a12cbfc3.html. 
 197. Private Equity vs. Venture Capital: What’s the Difference?, PITCHBOOK: 
PITCHBOOK BLOG (Aug. 4, 2020), https://pitchbook.com/blog/private-equity-vs-
venture-capital-whats-the-difference. 
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interest as explained below.198 Additionally, the GP collects a 1% 
management fee and a 20% performance fee (on all returns over 
8%).199  
The following structure is different than traditional PE 
structures in that 60% of the assets of SVF are held in the form of 
common shares (Class A), and the other 40% are in the form of 
preferred shares (Class B).200 In order to attract outside investors, as 
LPs, SoftBank has agreed to reward them with a fixed 7% coupon, 
which is not tied to the performance of SVF’s assets.201  
 
Table 4. SoftBank Vision Fund Structure. 
Source: SoftBank Grp. Corp., Presentation on the SoftBank Vision 
Fund: Business Model and Accounting Treatment 4 (Nov. 7, 2018). 
 
The SoftBank Group Corp. (“SBG”) is the parent corporation and 
owns the following subsidiaries (“sub”): SB Investment Advisers 
(UK) Limited (“SBIA UK”), a wholly-owned sub, which is the GP 
 198. Dana Olsen, Vision Fund 101: Inside SoftBank’s $98B Vehicle, PITCHBOOK 
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/vision-fund-101-inside-softbanks-
93b-vehicle. 
 199. Eric J. Savitz, SoftBank Unveils Plans for $108 Billion Vision Fund 2, 
BARRONS (July 25, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/softbank-new-vision-
fund-51564109519. 
 200. Id.  
 201. See Primack, supra note 196. 
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that manages the SVF (that is a LP); SBIA US and SBIA JP are 
wholly-owned subs, which are U.S.- and Japan-based advisory 
companies that provide investment advisory services to SBIA UK; 
and the Limited Partnership (Fund).202  
SVF invests in startups in several ways, including direct equity 
investments (directly in the company) and tender offers (secondary 
stock purchases from existing shareholders).203 With regard to the 
size of investment and financing rounds, SoftBank is pouring 
unprecedented amounts of capital into unicorns that it identifies as 
market leaders.204 It is reported that it requires its fund managers to 
make a minimum of a $100 million investment in a startup.205   
The following are some of the challenges that are associated 
with SVF investments, as compared to traditional VC investments.  
There are several reports on conflicts of interest between SVF, some 
of its foreign LPs (investors), and investees as detailed below.  
First, as noted above, following the WeWork IPO failure, there is 
a concern among academics and the press that SVF negotiated for 
aggressive contractual provisions, IPO ratchets, or other anti-
dilution provisions, which will be triggered in an event of a low 
valuation following an IPO (compared to the large round of 
financing).206 The idea is that SVF negotiated for a downside 
protection that is very large due to the outsized amount of money 
that it invests in portfolio companies (to protect its investments).207 
 202. SoftBank Grp. Corp., Presentation on the SoftBank Vision Fund: Business 
Model and Accounting Treatment 51 (Nov. 7, 2018) (presentation slides available at 
https://group.softbank/system/files/pdf/ir/presentations/2019/investor_20181107_02_e
n.pdf). According to SoftBank, the distribution and performance fees are allocated in 
the following order. First, the foreign LPs holding Class B (preferred) receive the 
coupon (a fixed proportion of the investment principal). Second, SBIA UK (GP) 
receives performance fees. Finally, the Class A LP (SoftBank) receives a distribution 
based on investment performance. Id. at 21.  
 203. Id. at 31.  
 204. See White & Mirhaydari, supra note 194; see also Katrina Brooker, The 
Most Powerful Person in Silicon Valley, FAST CO. (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90285552/the-most-powerful-person-in-silicon-valley. 
 205. Brooker, supra note 204 (“The Vision Fund’s minimum investment in 
startups is $100 million, and in just over two years since its October 2016 debut, it’s 
committed more than $70 billion”). 
 206. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Toxic Unicorns: What Has Been Missed about 
WeWork’s Fiasco, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 6, 2019), 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/11/06/toxic-unicorns-what-has-been-
missed-about-weworks-fiasco/; see also Kana Inagaki et al., SoftBank Investors Brace 
for Vision Fund Writedowns, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/ccdaa9c6-d60d-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77. 
 207. Inagaki et al., supra note 206. 
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There is a need to conduct more investigations on this, especially 
compared to other unicorns that recently went public.  
Second, most traditional VC funds do not have a nationwide 
presence and are frequently organized as small partnerships.208 
They are “hands on” investors who monitor their investments very 
closely.209 They provide mentoring and management services for the 
startups that they invest in, such as accounting, networking, and 
finding partners, investors, and even new management.210 
Therefore, VC funds usually prefer to invest in startups that are 
close to their geographic location, which allows them to provide 
services more easily (there are exceptions – Israel).211  
VCs offer “optimal services” to an entrepreneurial firm that is 
positioned within the fund’s concentrated industry, which is usually 
very narrowly defined.212 SoftBank, on the other hand, is investing 
very broadly. Its investments are reported to range from “artificial 
intelligence and machine learning to optimize every industry that 
affects our lives—from real estate to food to transportation.”213  
Third, there are mixed reports on monitoring the management 
and on the appointing of directors to the board of directors. Some 
claim that SVF tries to influence the management and board of 
directors of the companies that it invests in.214 Others claim that 
SVF does not care about monitoring rights but rather contracts for 
downside protection.215  
 208. See Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.–Dec. 
1998), https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works. 
 209. See generally id. 
 210. See generally id.  
 211. See LARS OLA BENGTSSON, REPEATED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VENTURE 
CAPITALISTS AND ENTREPRENEURS 3 (2006); see also Ola Bengtsson & David 
H. Hsu, How Do Venture Capital Partners Match with Startup Founders? 1 (Mar. 
11, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568131); Avraham Ravid & Ola Bengtsson, The 
Geography of Venture Capital Contracts 6 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) 
(available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361827) (under 
review).  
 212. Bengtsson & Hsu, supra note 211.  
 213. Brooker, supra note 204 (“The Vision Fund’s minimum investment in 
startups is $100 million, and in just over two years since its October 2016 debut, it’s 
committed more than $70 billion.”). 
 214. See, e.g., Eliot Brown, SoftBank Scraps $16 Billion Plan to Buy Most of 
WeWork, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-scraps-16-
billion-plan-to-buy-most-of-wework-11546905398; Liz Hoffman et al., SoftBank’s 
Biggest Backers Balk at Planned $16 Billion Acquisition of WeWork, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-finds-limits-to-its-love-for-
wework-as-investors-push-back-11545225988. 
 215. See Inagaki et al., supra note 206. 
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Unfortunately, there are mixed reports on SoftBank monitoring 
its investments and on whether SoftBank appoints directors to the 
board of directors or truly advises portfolio companies on business 
plan and strategy.216 For more analysis on this, see the discussion of 
SoftBank’s investment217 in WeWork below.  
Fourth, SoftBank is investing in competing businesses.218 This 
raises the question of whether it requires the startups to waive 
corporate opportunity provisions and fiduciary duty doctrines.219 As 
noted above, there are several reports on conflicts of interests 
between SoftBank and its LPs involving investments in competing 
technologies.220 SoftBank representatives are perhaps serving on 
boards of multiple portfolio companies.221 This is a common practice 
among VC and PE fund representatives.222 It is also common that 
portfolio companies will compete, operate in the same line of 
business, or even share what is considered proprietary information 
(including business partners, customers, or employees).223  
This sort of behavior raises concerns not only about potential 
anti-competitive behavior of SoftBank, but also requires companies 
to abandon corporate fiduciary duties, which affect private ordering. 
For example, there are suggestions by journalists on consolidation in 
many industries as a result of direct SoftBank investments.224 For 
 216. See, e.g., Stephanie Findlay, SoftBank Appoints Telecoms Veteran as India 
Country Head, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/32f5cd68-
3d19-11ea-a01a-bae547046735; Ingrid Lunden, SoftBank-Backed Fair Appoints New 
CEO: Bradley Stewart, ex-CEO of XOJet, TECHCRUNCH (May 11, 2020), 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/05/11/softbank-backed-fair-appoints-new-ceo-bradley-
stewart-ex-ceo-of-xojet/. 
 217. Brown, supra note 214. 
 218. Robbie Whelan & Eliot Brown, SoftBank is Funding Every Side of a 
Bruising Startup Battle, WALL ST. J. (Jan 20, 2020, 10:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/softbank-is-funding-every-side-of-latin-americas-bruising-startup-battle-
11580398900. 
 219. See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary 
Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 
COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017).  
 220. See, e.g., Findlay, supra note 216; Lunden, supra note 216. 
 221. The Visionaries and Portfolio Companies, SOFTBANK VISION FUND, 
https://visionfund.com/portfolio (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). 
 222. See id.  
 223. See id.  
 224. See, e.g., Tatiana Bautzer, Japan’s SoftBank Sees Consolidation in Latam 
Food Delivery, REUTERS (May 13, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-softbank-
group-latam/japans-softbank-sees-consolidation-in-latam-food-delivery-
idUSKBN22P2GR; Karan Choudhury, How SoftBank is Steering E-Commerce 
Consolidation Against Google, Amazon, BUS. STANDARD (Apr. 23, 2018), 
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example, it has been suggested that some ride-hailing businesses are 
consolidated as a direct result of the SoftBank investments.225  
TechCrunch and Recode reported that Uber engaged in anti-
competitive arrangements with Grab in Southeast Asia as a direct 
result of the PIF and SoftBank investments in Uber.226 Antitrust 
analysis is outside the scope of this Article, but there are several 
scholars who are currently trying to track these developments and 
are concerned about their effects.227  
Fifth, some commentators are also accusing SoftBank of not 
pursuing strictly financial objectives, but rather for having strategic 
goals because of its main investors.228 For example, PIF is one of the 
https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/how-softbank-is-steering-e-
commerce-consolidation-against-google-amazon-118042300008_1.html. 
 225. See Whelan & Brown, supra note 218. 
 226. See Johana Bhuiyan, Uber Is Selling Its Southeast Asia Business to 
Competitor Grab, VOX (Mar. 25, 2018, 10:14 PM), https://www.vox.com/ 
2018/3/25/17162972/uber-grab-southeast-asia-sale-acquisition-taxi-ride-share-dara-
khosrowshahi; Jon Russell, Uber and Grab Hit With $9.5M in Fines over ‘Anti-
Competitive’ Merger, TECHCRUNCH (Sep. 24, 2018, 12:13 AM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/23/uber-and-grab-hit-with-9-5m-in-fines/ [hereinafter 
Russell, Uber and Grab Hit]. According to these reports, Southeast Asia is 
considered a growth market due to its “cumulative population of over 600 million 
people,” and many of whom are coming online for the first time, but it is also 
considered a loss-making market for new industries like ride-sharing—particularly 
when two companies are locked in a subsidies war. Jon Russell, Report: Southeast 
Asia’s Internet Economy to Grow to $200B by 2025, TECHCRUNCH (May 24, 2016, 
4:59 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/24/report-southeast-asias-internet-
economy-to-grow-to-200b-by-2025/. Uber, which had presence in eight countries in 
Southeast Asia, agreed to sell to the local rival Grab, which is also owned by PIF and 
SoftBank. Russell, Uber and Grab Hit, supra. It was further reported that Uber got 
“a 27.5 percent stake in” Grab, and that Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi would join 
Grab’s board. Bhuiyan, supra. The Singapore antitrust agency levied $9.5 million in 
fines on Uber and Grab, accusing Grab of using its “position as market leader to 
unfairly raise fares after the Uber exit.” Grace Dobush, SoftBank is Placing Another 
Huge Bet on Ridesharing with Its $100 Billion Vision Fund, FORTUNE (Oct. 5, 2018, 
3:41 AM), https://fortune.com/2018/10/05/softbank-grab-500-million-investment/. 
Uber and Grab are not the only car sharing companies, Softbank also invested in 
Chinese Didi Chuxing, using its Delta Fund. SoftBank’s Son Says to Create World’s 
Biggest Solar Power Company in Saudi Arabia, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2018, 10:02 PM), 
https://fr.reuters.com/article/saudi-softbank-group-idAFL3N1RA21P.  
 227. Sing. Mgmt. Univ., The Case for Cross-ownership, ASIANSCIENTIST 
(Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.asianscientist.com/2019/09/features/cross-ownership-
investment-finance/. 
 228. See Edward Ongweso, Jr. SoftBank’s New Strategy: Screw Over Startups 
Not Investors, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en_us/ 
article/y3mdej/softbanks-new-strategy-screw-over-startups-not-investors. 
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largest investors in SoftBank’s Vision Fund.229 Commentators 
suggest that PIF perhaps uses Softbank in order to invest in leading 
startups indirectly (PIF invested in 50 or 60 tech companies through 
SoftBank).230 It was recently reported, however, that PIF will not 
invest in Vision Fund II.231  
Finally, some VCs expressed concern about the entrance of new 
nontraditional foreign players investing directly in the market,232 
and their adverse effect on the traditional startup funding model,233 
which is discussed below. It should be noted, on the flip side, that 
other VCs (and the NVCA) are concerned about the new powers of 
the U.S. government to scrutinize the investments of foreign 
strategic investors, which is also discussed below.  
 
2. Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
In addition to recent increases in investment activity from CVCs, 
there is an explosion in sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”)234 that are 
 229. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Saudi Arabia is Reportedly Talking to SoftBank 
About Pouring Billions into Its Second Vision Fund, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 28, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-reportedly-considers-investing-in-
softbank-vision-fund-2-2019-10. 
 230. Andrew Torchia et al., Saudi’s PIF Invested in 50-60 Firms Via SoftBank 
Fund: Director, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2018, 2:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-saudi-investment-pif/saudis-pif-invested-in-50-60-firms-via-softbank-fund-
director-idUSKCN1MX12X; see Press Release, SoftBank Grp. Corp., About the 
Establishment of SoftBank Vision Fund: Strategic Alliance with Public Investment 
Fund of Saudi Arabia (Oct. 14, 2016), https://group.softbank/en/corp/ 
news/press/sb/2016/20161014_01/. 
 231. See Zubair Naeem Paracha, PIF Won’t Invest in Vision Fund 2, MENABYTES 
(Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.menabytes.com/pif-wont-invest-vision-fund-2/. 
 232. Jason D. Rowley, Venture Capital’s Sovereign Wealth Crisis Cometh, 
CRUNCHBASE (Dec. 31, 2018), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/venture-capitals-
sovereign-wealth-crisis-cometh/. 
 233. “Many venerable VCs view the unicorn phenomenon with scorn, operating 
under the assumption that billion- dollar valuations are a distraction—and 
potentially a detriment—to the traditional startup funding model.” PITCHBOOK, 
UNICORN REPORT: 2017 ANNUAL 3 (2017).  
 234. Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are a type of sovereign investment vehicle, 
which has an independent corporate identity in order to invest for commercial return 
(often for a long term). BOCCONI UNIV., HUNTING UNICORNS: SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUND ANNUAL REPORT 2016 8 (2016) [hereinafter HUNTING UNICORNS]; see also 
Sofia Johan et al., Determinants of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in Private 
Equity (TILEC, Discussion Paper No. 2010-044, 2011), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1722206 (“the first SWF may have been established in 1953 by the 
establishment of the Kuwait Investment Authority”). Andrew Rozanov is credited 
with coining the term “Sovereign Wealth Fund” in 2005. See generally ANDREW 
ROZANOV, WHO HOLDS THE WEALTH OF NATIONS? (2005).  
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deploying large amounts of capital to unicorns, which are considered 
high risk investments in private equities.235 What is a SWF? There 
is no universally accepted definition of a SWF. However, for the 
purpose of this Article, a SWF will be defined as a type of 
“investment fund[] owned and managed by national 
governments.”236 The term was first coined by Andrew Rozanov, an 
executive of State Street Global Advisors.237  
SWFs are completely different investment vehicles than private 
entities, such as VCs. SWFs are formed by numerous types of 
governments, ranging from autocratic to democratic, in order to 
manage resources (savings and investments) for future 
generations.238 As detailed below, there are different types and 
structures of SWF investment vehicles, varying from independent 
financial institutions to central banks. 239 There is controversy 
among academics and policymakers surrounding the lack of 
transparency of these funds; their extra-large size; possible non-
commercial, non-financial goals; and potential influence over the 
financial stability of their target nations.240  
Foreign actors and governments are directly investing in 
unicorns using SWF vehicles by accumulating large stakes in purely 
private entities that once were solely in the domain of specialized VC 
investors. Many commentators are concerned about these trends, 
including Edwin Truman, a former assistant secretary for the U.S. 
Treasury, who stated that, “This characteristic is unnerving and 
disquieting. It calls into question our most basic assumptions about 
the structure and functioning of our economies and the international 
financial system.”241
  
 235. See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1345, 1347–48 (2008). 
 236. See MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34336, SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2009). 
 237. ROZANOV, supra note 234. 
 238. See Andrew Ang, The Four Benchmarks of Sovereign Wealth Funds 1 (Sept. 
21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1680485).  
 239. Id.  
 240. See WEISS, supra note 236, at 8; Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 235, at 
1360–61; Johan et al., supra note 234, at 2. 
 241. Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foreign Government 
Investments in the United States: Assessing the Economic and National Security 
Implications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 110th 
Cong. 58 (2007) (written statement of Edwin M. Truman, Senior Fellow, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics); Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Scoreboard: Uneven Progress, Featuring Edwin M. Truman, PIIE (Nov. 
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From Asia to oil-rich Middle Eastern and European countries,242 
the number of SWFs’ assets under management is estimated at 
$6.31–$8 trillion.243 In the past, SWFs did not invest in risky tech 
ventures. The new investment trend in unicorn firms represents a 
shift in SWFs’ investment strategy and ordinary risk profile.244 
 
The changes in investment strategies of SWFs can be the result 
of several factors.245 First, unicorns and tech companies are 
perceived as having high-growth potential.246 Second, SWFs are able 
to diversify their portfolio, which traditionally comprised of 
traditional conservative investment.247 Finally, investments by 
SWFs in unicorns can help stimulate their local economies.248  
One of the most significant developments is that some SWFs are 
changing not only the types of assets that they invest in but also the 
patterns of investment.249 Despite the lack of transparency in their 
operations and strategies, there are recent news reports on cases 
where SWFs changed their investment patterns altogether from 
passive to active (direct participation) investments.250 A “direct” 
SWF investment refers to a situation in which the SWF invests in 
the securities of a private firm directly, and not passively, using a 
separate investment vehicle, such as a private equity fund.251 Until 
recently, SWFs invested passively as LPs in tech companies, using 
the help of professional money managers, i.e., PEs or VCs to do the 
investments for them.  
These developments raise several questions. First, what is the 
role that governments play in the innovation process and in 
managing wealth for future generations? Throughout U.S. history, 
the government has played the role of catalyst and even venture 
3, 2016), https://www.piie.com/experts/peterson-perspectives/sovereign-wealth-fund-
scoreboard-uneven-progress; see also Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 235, at 1347.  
 242. See HUNTING UNICORNS, supra note 234, at 8.  
 243. Joseph A. McCahery & F. Alexander de Roode, Co-Investments of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds in Private Equity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS 247, n.1 (Douglas Cumming et al. eds., 2017). For the most recent estimate, 
see Adam Putz, What Is a Sovereign Wealth Fund?, PITCHBOOK (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://pitchbook.com/news/author/adam-putz. 
 244. See HUNTING UNICORNS, supra note 234, at 5. 
 245. Jerome Engel et al., Pursuing Innovation: Sovereign Wealth Fundsand 
Technology Investment (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2864853). 
 246. Id.  
 247. Id.  
 248. Id.  
 249. See McCahery & de Roode, supra note 243, at 247. 
 250. Id. at 263.  
 251. Id. at 249. 
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capitalist to promote innovation, technological research, 
development, and commercialization.252 As described in detail below, 
U.S. policymakers are concerned when foreign governments are 
directly intervening, “playing” in the U.S. high-growth technology, 
innovation, and industrial spheres. This raises the question of 
whether foreign governments are deliberately interfering in the U.S. 
innovation process for political reasons. There are also redistribution 
geopolitical issues. According to Ang, the rise of SWFs is perhaps 
meant to redistribute wealth from the West to the East.253  
This Article will turn to the impact of these alternative 
investments on unicorn firms, by starting with an explanation of the 
different structures, objectives and incentives of the players.   
 
a. Sovereign Wealth Funds & Comparison to Venture Capital 
 
There are different categories of SWFs depending on their 
objectives and goals. The International Money Fund divides a SWF 
into the following three primary types: (1) Stabilization funds, which 
“tend to be more conservative in their investment decisions, focusing 
on fixed income rather than equity investments”;254 (2) Savings 
funds which “invest in a broader range of assets, including bonds 
and equities, as well as other forms of alternative investments, such 
as real estate, private equity, hedge funds, and commodities”;255 and 
(3) reserve investment corporations, which “seek higher returns than 
other SWFs and use leverage (i.e., debt) in their investments.”256  
There are also many ways in which governments can choose to 
structure SWFs, depending on their objectives, origin, and 
governance; therefore, a one-size-fits-all structure chart is not 
appropriate here. SWFs have different investments goals, risk 
profiles, and strategies. Therefore, for the purpose of this Article, we 
will refer only to the funds that are investing in unicorn firms, 
directly or indirectly.  
SWFs are distinct from VCs and other types of investment funds. 
First, they report directly to their sovereign states and are not 
 252. See Constance E. Bagley & Anat Alon-Beck, Preparing for the Apocalypse: A 
Multi-Prong Proposal to Develop Countermeasures for Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, and Nuclear Threats, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 823, 835 (2018). 
 253. See Ang, supra note 238. 
 254. See WEISS, supra note 236, at 3. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 4.  
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subject to any financial scrutiny from other investors.257 Second, 
they have different legal structures and management styles 
depending on their origin.258 Third, it is not clear if they have to 
comply with any regulations or reporting requirements;259 rather, it 
depends on the laws and regulations of the sovereign state that 
appoints their managers or members of the SWF board of directors. 
Fourth, they might have non-financial objectives, such as increasing 
their political influence by making investments overseas.260  
Fifth, they are usually long-term investors and share the goals of 
preserving the wealth of the sovereign nation for future use.261 
Sixth, they frequently acquire large stakes in the target firms.262 
Seventh, they have flexibility in choosing their investments.263 
Finally, it is not clear if SWFs have the ability or desire to monitor 
their investments because it will depend on whether the SWF 
chooses to take control rights using contractual mechanisms, such as 
voting rights or observation or board seats.264  
It is also important to distinguish between a passive investment 
by a SWF and the new trend of a hybrid or direct active investment. 
It seems that western governments and policymakers are not as 
concerned, as they are with LPs, if SWF investments are passive. If, 
however, the SWFs are active and starting to act like VCs by 
intervening in the market directly, then the question is whether 
SWFs can succeed, capitalize on their investments, recruit the right 
talent, and source suitable deals.265 Because SWFs are very different 
from VC funds, it is hard to compare between the management style 
and incentive structures of these vehicles, especially due to lack of 
information and overall opaqueness.  
SWF investments in unicorns change the traditional VC 
investment patterns and affect private ordering because of the 
massive deployment of capital into the hands of founders (agency 
 257. See April M. Knill et al., Bilateral Political Relations and the Impact of 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment 9 (Mar. 9, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) 
(available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1498518); see also Adair Morse, Large 
Investors' Influence in Private Equity Funds 5 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) 
(available at https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? 
doi=10.1.1.650.5714&rep=rep1&type=pdf).  
 258. Knill et al., supra note 257. 
 259. Id.  
 260. Id.  
 261. Id.  
 262. Id.  
 263. Id.  
 264. Id.  
 265. See HUNTING UNICORNS, supra note 234, at 47–48.  
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cost). By joining late stage investment rounds, they contribute to 
high valuations and cause the companies to stay private longer, 
which can contribute to volatility and inaccurate pricing.266 In terms 
of corporate governance, more research needs to be done to 
determine whether SWFs are bargaining for any control rights. Due 
to the geopolitical nature of these investments, the following is an 
account of why U.S. and other Western policymakers are concerned 
about these developments.267 
SWFs are not only growing rapidly in size and number,268 but as 
noted, they are also changing their investment strategy by directly 
investing in unicorns. They are doing so by opening offices in Palo 
Alto, forming joint ventures with other investment funds, and co-
investing as GPs alongside private equity, not merely as LPs.269 
They have also been accused of “hunting unicorns,”270 and these 
accusations stem from news reports of hiring and stuffing their 
offices with experienced Western dealmakers that are charged with 
directly investing in these firms.  
There is a heated debate on whether the U.S. government should 
regulate or limit certain investments in entrepreneurial high-growth 
and high-tech startup firms and the impact of such an effort on our 
economy.271 SWFs pose many challenges for U.S. regulators.272 
There is a concern that SWFs are ultimately controlled by foreign 
governments and therefore their managers can take non-financial 
measures into account, such as political and strategic.  
The national security concerns are that SWFs may use their 
economic influence to obtain critical sensitive information from the 
 266. See McCahery & de Roode, supra note 243, at 247.  
 267. See Georges Kratsas & Jon Truby, Regulating Sovereign Wealth Funds to 
Avoid Investment Protectionism, 1 J. FIN. REG. 95, 95 (2015).  
 268. Id.  
 269. See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Sovereign Wealth Funds Embrace Their 
Growing Ambitions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/10/08/business/dealbook/sovereign-wealth-funds-embrace-their-ambitions.html; 
Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund Buys Significant Stakes in U.S. Companies, 
U.S.–SAUDI BUS. COUNCIL (May 29, 2020), https://us-sabc.org/saudi-arabias-public-
investment-fund-buys-significant-stakes-in-u-s-companies/. 
 270. See HUNTING UNICORNS, supra note 234, at 5; see also Unicorn Hunters: 
These Investors Have Backed the Most Billion-Dollar Companies, CBINSIGHTS (May 
7, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/best-venture-capital-unicorn-spotters-
2/. 
 271. See, e.g., Jeff Farrah, Foreign Investment Scrutiny: 5 Questions Every 
Venture Investor Should Know the Answer to, NVCA BLOG (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://nvca.org/blog/foreign-investment-scrutiny-5-questions-every-venture-investor-
know-answer/. 
 272. See generally McCahery & de Roode, supra note 243.  
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companies that they invest in (tunneling), transfer jobs or assets 
abroad to their home country, or even compromise the operation of 
strategically important companies.273  
More research needs to be done to understand the extent to 
which SWFs use non-financial, strategic, or political objectives. More 
information on their legal status, board structure, oversight, control 
rights, and political objectives will also be helpful. Though there are 
some data samples on these issues, they are not comprehensive.274  
Private firms can be more vulnerable to tunneling because they 
operate under the radar, do not to disclose information to the public, 
and often lack the same formal corporate governance mechanisms as 
public companies.275 It is plausible that certain SWFs may choose to 
invest in private firms where they are blocked from investing in 
public firms.276  
The following new legislation is changing the ways in which 
American and multinational companies are raising capital from 
foreigners.  
 
b. The Future of Foreign Investment & CFIUS 
 
On August 13, 2018, President Trump signed the John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (“FY 2019 
NDAA”), which is an omnibus bill that authorizes defense spending. It 
incorporates the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 
(“FIRRMA”).277 FIRRMA is meant to deal with the economic and 
 273. See Johan et al., supra note 234, at 6; see also S. Johnson et al., Tunneling, 
90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22 (2000); Rumu Sarkar, Sovereign Wealth Funds as a 
Development Tool for ASEAN Nations: From Social Wealth to Social Responsibility, 
41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 621, 625, 643 (2010); Tony Tassel & Joanna Chung, How 
Sovereign Wealth Funds are Muscling in on Global Markets, FIN. TIMES (May 24, 
2007), https://www.ft.com/content/ffcc6948-0a21-11dc-93ae-000b5df10621. 
 274. Johan et al., supra note 234, at 7. 
 275. Id. at 10. 
 276. Id. 
 277. See Press Release, John Cornyn, U.S. Sen. for Tex., U.S. Senate, Cornyn, 
Feinstein, Burr Introduce Bill to Strengthen the CFIUS Review Process, Safeguard 
Nat’l Security (Nov. 8, 2017), https://votesmart.org/public-statement/1204881/cornyn-
feinstein-burr-introduce-bill-to-strengthen-the-cfius-review-process-safeguard-
national-security#.XDhyeC2ZPEZ; see also Farhad Jalinous et al., Client Alert, 
CFIUS Reform Becomes Law: What FIRRMA Means for Industry, WHITE & CASE 
(Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cfius-reform-becomes-
law-what-firrma-means-industry; Robert Williams, CFIUS Reform and U.S. 
Government Concerns over Chinese Investment: A Primer, LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 13, 
2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cfius-reform-and-us-government-concerns-over-
chinese-investment-primer; Stephanie Zable, The Foreign Investment Risk Review 
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security impact of foreign investments in emerging technologies in 
the United States. After a lengthy wait, the Treasury Department 
released the rules that implement FIRRMA, which have been in 
effect since February 13, 2020.278 
FIRRMA amended the review process of the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”). It also 
incorporates the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (“ECRA”). FIRRMA 
gives CFIUS the ability to review investments by foreign entities in critical 
U.S. technology firms.279 It gives power to the U.S. government to 
scrutinize foreign investments.280  
In the past, CFIUS had authority to review transactions with 
controlling investments, but today, due to the new reforms, CFIUS 
can review even minority, non-controlling investments.281 The 
following events can trigger review: if the foreign investor has: (1) access to 
material non-public technical information; (2) a seat on the board of 
directors or observer rights; and (3) substantive decision-making 
capability (other than voting shares).282 VC funds are now also 
required to carefully evaluate what information or rights they can 
transfer to the LP foreign investor if the investment is made in 
“critical technology.”283  
CFIUS is now a powerful actor in the U.S. entrepreneurship 
ecosystem. To illustrate, CFIUS recently intervened in several 
transactions concerning startups, emerging technology, and data 
aggregation by requiring Chinese companies to divest.284 PatientsLikeMe, 
Grindr, and TikTok are recent examples. PatientsLikeMe is a healthcare 
Modernization Act of 2018, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-investment-risk-review-modernization-act-
2018.  
 278. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Releases Regulations to 
Reform National Security Reviews for Certain Foreign Investments and Other 
Transactions in the United States (Jan. 13, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/ 
news/press-releases/sm872. 
 279. See generally GIBSON DUNN, CFIUS REFORM: TOP TEN TAKEAWAYS FROM 
THE FINAL FIRRMA RULES (2020). 
 280. See generally id.  
 281. Final CFIUS Regulations Implement Significant Changes by Broadening 
Jurisdiction and Updating Scope of Reviews, SHEARMAN & STERLING (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2020/01/final-cfius-regulations-implement-
changes-by-broadening-jurisdiction-and-updating-scope-of-reviews. 
 282. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.211 (2020).  
 283. Farrah, supra note 271. 
 284. See generally Henry Clark et al., Grindr and PatientsLikeMe Outcomes 
Show Non-Cleared Transactions’ Exposure to CFIUS Scrutiny, Especially When PII 
is Involved, JDSUPRA (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/grindr-
and-patientslikeme-outcomes-show-76276/. 
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startup that was forced into a fire sale after CFIUS’s intervention.285 In 
2017, PatientsLikeMe sold a controlling stake to Chinese iCarbonX, an 
artificial intelligence technology company.286 CFIUS intervened due to 
concerns over the Chinese government gaining access to the data of U.S. 
health care customers.287  
Similarly, Grindr, the LGBTQ dating app, also collects personal data 
of its users.288 CFIUS intervened over concerns that the Chinese 
government can access data on American officials’ sexual orientation or 
dating habits, and use it to blackmail or influence these officials in the 
future.289 TikTok, the dance app, recently filed a petition with a U.S. Court 
of Appeals asking for a review of actions by CFIUS.290 CFIUS had 
instructed its parent company, ByteDance Ltd., which is a Chinese 
company, to divest its ownership of American assets.291  
The new rules will continue to have an impact on the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, especially on a startup firm’s ability to raise capital privately 
from foreign investments, including but not limited to foreign VCs, foreign 
CVCs, foreign individuals, or family offices.292 One of the main 
developments is the impact on direct investments, which can trigger a 
CFIUS filing, if the foreign LP will bargain for a board seat or be able to 
gain access to sensitive information.293  
The question of whether the existence of direct or indirect foreign 
investors justifies the adoption of a particular set of national or 
 285. Christina Farr & Ari Levy, The Trump Administration is Forcing this 
Health Start-up that Took Chinese Money into a Fire Sale, CNBC (Apr. 4, 2019, 12:57 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/04/cfius-forces-patientslikeme-into-fire-sale-
booting-chinese-investor.html. 
 286. Id.  
 287. Id.  
 288. David E. Sanger, Grindr Is Owned by a Chinese Firm, and the U.S. Is 
Trying to Force It to Sell, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/03/28/us/politics/grindr-china-national-security.html. 
 289. For more examples on this, see MoneyGram and Ant Financial, Huawei and others. 
See Ana Swanson & Paul Mozur, MoneyGram and Ant Financial Call Off Merger, Citing 
Regulatory Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/ 
business/moneygram-ant-financial-china-cfius.html. 
290 Rachel Lerman & Jeanne Whalen, TikTok Sale Deadline Is Thursday, but a 
Proposed Deal Has Not Moved Forward, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/11/10/tiktok-petition-stop-sale/. 
 291. Id.  
 292. See Jeff Farrah, CFIUS & VC: 3 Takeaways from the Final Rules and What 
Investors Must Know, NVCA BLOG (Jan. 27, 2020), https://nvca.org/cfius-vc-3-takeaways-from-
the-final-rules-and-what-investors-must-know/; see also Farhad Jalinous et al., CFIUS 
Finalizes New FIRRMA Regulations, WHITE & CASE (Jan. 22, 2020),  
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cfius-finalizes-new-firrma-regulations. 
 293. For more on the changes and the NVCAs advocacy on this, see Farrah, supra note 
271.  
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international foreign investment regulations is outside the scope of 
this Article.294  
 
3. Crossover Funds 
 
Crossover funds are funds that traditionally invest in publicly 
traded companies and cross over to invest in privately held 
companies. Mutual fund and hedge fund managers are turning their 
attention to the private market in the hopes of capitalizing on the 
high returns of unicorns before they do an IPO. Prominent examples 
of crossover fund investors include multibillion-dollar firms Tiger 
Global and Fidelity Investments.  
Unicorns are interested in securing crossover financings in order 
to buy them more time before they do an IPO. Crossover mutual 
funds and hedge fund investors are interested in investing in a pre-
IPO unicorn for several reasons. The crossover investors can access 
information about the unicorn before it goes pubic and can 
potentially get an opportunity to invest by getting a discount on 
their investment (which can increase their return if the IPO goes 
well).  
The following is an account of these developments.  
 
a. Mutual Funds & Comparison to Venture Capital 
 
A mutual fund (“MF”) is a type of an investment company,295 
which pools money of many investors (individuals and entities) and 
then invests in a diversified portfolio296 of investment securities such 
as “pools of stocks, bonds, and other.”297 Members of the public can 
 294. For more on SWFs, see Anat Alon-Beck, Who Gets to Invest in Private 
Markets? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (work in progress).  
 295. Section 3(a)(1) of the Investment Company Act defines an “investment 
company” for purposes of the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) 
(2018). Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act defines an investment 
company as an issuer which is or “holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or 
proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in 
securities.” Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A). Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Investment Company 
Act also defines an investment company as an issuer that is engaged or “proposes to 
engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in 
securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value 
exceeding 40[%] of the value of [its] total assets (exclusive of Government securities 
and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.” Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C). 
 296. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 
J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 94 (2017).  
 297. See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of 
Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1234 (2014). The 
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buy shares in these funds and usually have a right to “redeem” them 
daily.298 Redemption means that the shareholders have a right to 
“return their shares to the funds in exchange for the cash value of 
their shares.”299 
Illiquid assets are the new favorite investment vehicle for MFs, 
and many academics and policymakers are concerned about the 
managers’ ability to manage such investments.300 The issue is that 
MF301 managers302 invest in unicorn shares through primary and 
secondary transactions. Unicorns’ shares are assets that are less 
liquid than cash, making the ability to exit and liquidate the 
investment more uncertain. Therefore, there is a concern about the 
ability of the managers to manage the liquidity mismatch.303  
primary law that governs investment companies is the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (the “Investment Company Act”). The SEC has adopted various regulations 
under the Investment Company Act that further govern investment company 
operations. These regulations are published in Title 17 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (“CFR”), Part 270. Investment companies are also subject to other 
federal securities laws (e.g., the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The SEC has also adopted various regulations 
generally applicable to investment companies under these laws. 
 298. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (Supp. 1987). The term “redeemable security” is 
defined in Section 2(a)(32) of the Investment Company Act. MFs hold a portfolio of 
securities, typically managed by an investment adviser. MFs generally offer an 
unlimited number of their shares to the public on a continuous basis. 
 299. Morley, supra note 297, at 1235. Open-end companies (“mutual funds”) are 
management investment companies that offer or have outstanding redeemable 
securities of which they are the issuers. See § 80a-5(a)(1). The term “redeemable 
security” is defined in Section 2(a)(32) of the Investment Company Act. Mutual funds 
hold a portfolio of securities, typically managed by an investment adviser. Mutual 
funds generally offer an unlimited number of their shares to the public on a 
continuous basis. 
 300. See Qi Chen et al., Payoff Complementarities and Financial Fragility: 
Evidence from Mutual Fund Outflows, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 239, 240 (2010); Itay 
Goldstein et al., Investor Flows and Fragility in Corporate Bond Funds, 126 J. FIN. 
ECON. 592, 593 (2017); Sergey Chernenko & Adi Sunderam, Liquidity 
Transformation in Asset Management: Evidence from the Cash Holdings of Mutual 
Funds 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22391, 2016), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22391. 
 301. Management companies are divided into open-end companies and closed-
end companies. See § 80a-5(a)(1)–(2). This Article is referring to the open-end 
companies.  
 302. It should be noted that investment funds usually enter into contracts with 
“investment advisers,” to manage the portfolios. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 296, 
at 94. For more on fund managers, see Morley, supra note 297, at 1245.  
 303. THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OPEN-ENDED FUND LIQUIDITY AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT — GOOD PRACTICES AND ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION: FINAL REPORT 2 
(2018). 
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On July 29, 2019, Business Insider reported that the SEC is 
“stepping up scrutiny of mutual funds that have poured money 
into unicorns, like WeWork and Airbnb,” to protect mom-and-pop 
investors that invest in these funds.304 There are increasing calls for 
action from academics and regulators305 concerning the liquidity 
disparity and financial instability of open-end MFs because of the 
increase in their illiquid asset holdings.306  
One scholar, Zeng, warns that such investments can increase the 
probability for a bank-run-like scenario if investors are concerned 
about the nature or illiquidity of their investments.307 In the event of 
a future recession or economic crisis, the public stock market and 
their investors can be affected by the behavior of unicorn firms and 
their new investors.308  
However, it must be noted that MFs have a long tradition of 
investing in illiquid assets. They invested in mature private 
companies309 and thinly traded debt instruments.310 From 2010,311 
 304. Bradley Saacks & Dakin Campbell, The SEC is Stepping Up Scrutiny of 
Mutual Funds that Have Poured Money into Unicorns Like WeWork and Airbnb, 
BUS. INSIDER (July 29, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/sec-steps-up-scrutiny-
of-private-stakes-held-by-funds-2019-7. 
 305. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to 
Modernize Information Reported by Funds, Require Liquidity Risk Management 
Programs, and Permit Swing Pricing (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/pressrelease/2016-215.html; see also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL 2015 
ANNUAL REPORT 110–20 (2015); INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY REPORT: APRIL 2015, at 93–135 (2015); Yao Zeng, A Dynamic Theory of 
Mutual Fund Runs and Liquidity Management 1 (Eur. Systemic Risk B., Working 
Paper No. 42, Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/193549/1/esrb-
wp42.pdf (“regulators are worried about the potential for a bank-run-like scenario on 
mutual funds ”).  
 306. See Zeng, supra note 305, at 1.  
 307. A large number of funds have experienced bank-run-like redemptions in 
2015 and 2016. See Zeng, supra note 305, at 1 n.2. In 2016, many real estate funds in 
the UK also experienced severe runs after the vote for the Brexit. Id. 
 308. The other concern is about liquidity. If the liquidity dries up in public 
markets, it can cause volatility. See Kate Rooney, Private Equity’s Allure Poses Big 
Risks for the Stock Market and Its Investors in the Next Recession, CNBC (May 11, 
2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/10/private-equitys-allure-poses-big-
risks-for-the-stock-market-and-its-investors-in-the-next-recession.html. BlackRock 
CEO Larry Fink is warning that “some investors may be over-allocating to 
alternatives as liquidity shrinks.” See Bloomberg Daybreak: Americas, TV Shows, 
BlackRock CEO Fink Warns on Alternative Investments, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2019, 
8:37 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2019-05-08/blackrock-ceo-fink-
warns-on-alternative-investments-video. 
 309. For more on MFs investing in illiquid privately-owned firms, see Restricted 
Securities, Investment Company Act Release No. 5847, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989 (Dec. 31, 
1970). 
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large U.S. MFs directly invested in unicorns.312 Examples include 
Fidelity and T. Rowe Price.313 MFs hold more than $8 billion in 
unicorn stock, and this amount is increasing steadily.314 In order to 
invest in unicorns, MFs need to police the seven-day redemption 
requirement and limit the investments in their overall illiquid assets 
to 15% of their portfolios.315
 
 
There is a need for a clear policy from the SEC on the question of 
whether MFs should continue to invest in unicorn firms and, if so, 
how they can monitor their investments and protect their investors. 
The following is a comparison to VCs. 
MF managers are very different than traditional VC managers. 
First, if we compare the managers’ incentive, VC fund managers 
have stronger incentive for high investment returns, due to their 
compensation structure contracts.316 MF manager contracts usually 
do not allow the managers to capture a significant portion of (excess) 
returns.317 
Second, in general, the contractual provisions associated with 
the investments in the unicorns depend on timing of financing 
rounds, participating investors and performance of the startup. As 
noted above, VCs typically invest in earlier rounds than MFs, and 
 310. For more on MFs investing in illiquid debt, see Money Market Fund 
Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Securities Act Release No. 9616, 79 Fed. Reg. 
47,736 (Aug. 14, 2014) (discussing mutual-fund investments in illiquid debt). 
 311. See Kwon et al., supra note 82, at 415; Lerner et al., supra note 30, at 25 
(“[O]ver the 2010–2016 period, the number of distinct mutual funds directly 
investing in unicorns has increased from less than 10 to more than 140.”). 
 312. PITCHBOOK, supra note 233. Fidelity, for example, holds the second-highest 
number of current unicorns in any portfolio. See Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual 
Funds Invest in Startups? A Case Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund's Investments in 
Unicorns (and other Startups) and the Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 
1343–44 (2017). 
 313. William Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations 
with Reality 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23895, 2017).  
 314. Lerner et al., supra note 30, at 24–25; see also Gornall & Strabulaev, supra 
note 313, at 2. 
 315. See Schwartz, supra note 312, at 1365. Under SEC Guidelines, illiquid 
assets are defined as those “which may not be sold or disposed of in the ordinary 
course of business within seven days at approximately the value at which the mutual 
fund has valued the investment[.]” Revision of Guidelines to Form N-1A, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 9828, 9829 (Mar. 20, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 239, 274).  
316 See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review 2 (Found. & Trends in Fin., 
Working Paper No. 1947049, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947049.  
 317. Id.   
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bargain for preferred stock, extensive control rights, and control of 
the startup’s board of directors.318  
MFs are likely to invest in late stage rounds. Lerner et al. found 
that MF investments in unicorns are different than traditional VC 
because they are associated with fewer cash flow and control rights, 
for the following reasons.319 First, MFs will use straight convertible 
preferred stock rather than put emphasis on participating preferred 
stock,320 liquidation multiples that are greater than one,321 or 
cumulative dividends.  
Second, VCs routinely bargain for board and voting rights, and 
appoint directors to the board of their portfolio startups. Lerner et 
al. found that MFs are “less likely to include representation on the 
board of directors: mutual fund [rounds]. . . are thus less likely to 
directly monitor portfolio firms through board intervention or voting 
on important corporate actions.”322 This Article would like to add to 
this finding and explain it from a legal perspective.  
MFs are probably not going to directly appoint their own 
designee director to boards of unicorns because they can be dragged 
into shareholder litigation suits for breach of fiduciary duty 
concerning the decisions of their designee directors. Such 
appointment can create an imminent risk of liability for the MF if it 
gets sued for structural conflicts of interest under Delaware 
Corporate law.  
It should be noted that compared to VC fund managers, MF 
managers are heavily regulated and subject to strict fiduciary 
standards (such as those expressed in ERISA).323 Under current 
Delaware Corporate law, a director owes a fiduciary duty to the 
common shareholders and cannot solely take into account the 
interests of any one special class.324 The MF designee director can be 
 318. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 32, at 970 n.9.  
 319. See Lerner et al., supra note 30, at 3. 
 320. Id. at 5; see also Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting 
Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 
REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 286 (2003).  
 321. For an explanation on liquidation multiples, see Lerner et al., supra note 
30, at 14–15.  
 322. Id. at 5.  
 323. For a discussion on ERISA and fiduciary duties, see David H. Webber, The 
Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106 (2014).  
 324. For example, in the following two decisions, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery addressed the conflicts between preferred and common stockholders in the 
M&A context. In Frederic Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., the court refused 
to dismiss claims that a private equity fund and the directors of one of its portfolio 
companies breached their fiduciary duties to common stockholders by selling certain 
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accused of having a direct conflict of interest because of her ties to 
the economic interests of the MF that designated her.325 If things do 
not go well with regards to the startup’s performance, then the 
director can be put in direct conflict when deciding between the 
interests of common shareholders and the special classes. The board 
does not have a fiduciary duty to facilitate the MF’s request for 
redemption or to maximize current market value for the investors.326 
Common shareholders can bring suit against the MF designated 
director, alleging that the director breached her fiduciary duty to the 
common shareholders by voting in favor of the MF’s redemption 
needs and to the detriment of the common.327 Therefore, appointing 
a director to the board can drag the MF into very costly litigation 
and unwanted publicity and reputational damage due to public 
scrutiny. In cases of a conflict of interest, the director cannot rely on 
the business judgment rule,328 and cannot get indemnification for 
breach of the duty of loyalty.  
Therefore, the question of whether MFs are to be considered 
“dumb money” investing in unicorns that they cannot monitor or 
understand is a complicated one. On the one hand, MFs will not 
appoint directors to the board or provide other “direct corporate 
governance services similar to VCs,” and some scholars will claim 
that they are not monitoring their investments.329  
of the company’s business lines and assets in order to fund a mandatory redemption 
of preferred stock. No. 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *13–27 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 
2017). In In re Appraisal of GoodCents Holdings, Inc., the court determined that 
common stockholders who had received no consideration in a 2015 merger were 
entitled to a pro rata share of the merger proceeds. No. 11723-VCMR, 2017 WL 
2463665, at *3–5 (Del. Ch. June 7, 2017). For more on these cases, see John L. 
Hardiman & Melissa Sawyer, Delaware’s Most Recent Thinking on the Preferred-
Common Conflict, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/17/delawares-most-recent-thinking-on-the-
preferred-common-conflict/.   
 325. Frederic Hsu Living Tr., 2017 WL 1437308, at *13–27.  
 326. See generally, with regards to conflict of interests of VC directors, Gardner 
F. Davis & Richard E. Guyer, Venture Capital Firms and their Portfolio Company 
Directors Face Risk of Liability for Conflicts of Interest, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Apr. 
27, 2018), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2018/04/venture-capital-
firms-and-their-portfolio-company. 
 327. Frederic Hsu Living Tr., 2017 WL 1437308, at *13–27. 
 328. The business judgment rule protects directors from liability for good faith 
mistakes if there was no conflict. See generally LINDSAY C. LLEWELLYN, BREAKING 
DOWN THE BUSINESS-JUDGMENT RULE (2013). 
 329. See generally Sergey Chernenko et al., Mutual Funds as Venture 
Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns 4 (Dec. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) 
(available at https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/Mutual%20Funds%20as% 
20Venture%20Capitalists%3F%20Evidence%20from%20Unicorns-%20Paper.pdf).  
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On the other hand, MFs have other ways to protect their 
investments contractually and provide corporate governance services 
for monitoring. One, MFs are likely to negotiate for aggressive 
redemption rights and ask the firm to redeem their stake if certain 
conditions are not met.330 They can threaten the unicorn 
management with “exit” by “voting with their feet.” It should be 
noted that this is also problematic in the case of private unicorn 
firms (versus public companies) because MFs can find it very 
difficult to sell the shares due to the illiquidity of the secondary 
market.  
Additionally, MF managers have an obligation to value their 
investments on a daily basis;331 however, these valuations are 
subject to the manager’s discretion because there is no established 
market price, and many unicorns experience fluctuations in 
valuations. Therefore, some scholars are concerned that these prices 
are inaccurate.332 They warn about the opportunity for the 
manager’s misconduct, due to her discretion in valuation. A MF 
manager has incentives to choose high valuations, “which among 
other benefits to the fund, makes them appear more successful than 
their peers and increases the fees collected from investors.” 333 This 
may allow the manager to “report losses and gains when most 
advantageous for the fund rather than when they occur.”334 
There is also a question of whether the MF managers are going 
to use their “voice,” engage with the unicorn firm, and influence the 
firm’s governance decisions. Appel et al. suggest that even passive 
MFs influence a firm’s governance choices and increase firm value 
and longer-term performance.335 MFs can use “voice” to engage with 
management to try to institute change.336 It must be noted, however, 
 330. “[S]tronger redemption rights may also make the preferred stock easier to 
trade in the secondary market.” Id. at 5 n.4; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-18–80a-22 
(2018); 17 C.F.R. § 274.150 (2018). 
 331. Fund managers are required to value them each day. See 17 C.F.R. § 
270.22c-1(b)(1) (2016).  
 332. See Schwartz, supra note 312, at 1344. Funds have made headlines for 
marking down the values of their startups. See, e.g., Rolfe Winkler, Fidelity Marks 
Down Startups Including Dropbox, Zenefits, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2016, 1:34 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fidelity-marks-down-startups-including-dropbox-
zenefits-1459346847; Rolfe Winkler, T. Rowe Price Marks Down Most of Its Tech 
Startups, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2016, 6:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/t-rowe-
price-marks-down-most-of-its-tech-startups-1460759094. 
 333. Schwartz, supra note 312, at 1344; see also Lerner et al., supra note 30. 
 334. Schwartz, supra note 312, at 1344–45. 
 335. Ian R. Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 
111, 111–13 (2016). 
 336. See Brav et al., supra note 316, at 2 (discussing institutional engagement). 
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that there is a lot of criticism about the uncertainty and nature of 
MF engagement practices.337 More research is needed to determine 
whether MFs are using voice and engagement practices when 
investing in unicorns.  
Finally, Gornall and Strebulaev, and Lerner et al. demonstrated 
that MFs are likely to negotiate for IPO-related rights.338 They 
suggest an example of an investor’s contractual protection 
mechanism to require IPO ratchets, which can guarantee that the 
MFs will get a certain agreed upon return in the event the company 
does an IPO.339 It should be noted that according to several 
interviews with lawyers who represent clients in late stage private 
placements and law firms’ materials, there is a need to distinguish 
between full ratchet and weighted average.340 Accordingly, the MFs 
can negotiate full ratchet if the valuation is very high; however, this 
is very unusual, and “investors usually require weighted average 
using same formula as previous rounds.”341  
Another mechanism that the MF investors can use to protect 
their interests according to Lerner et al. is to retain veto rights on 
down-valuation IPOs. According to Gornall and Strebulaev, “most 
unicorns gave recent investors major protections such as an IPO 
return guarantees (14%), vetoes over down-IPOs (24%), or seniority 
to all other investors (32%).”342  
These new market dynamics affect the unicorn firm 
shareholders, managers, and employees. Lowery, Qian, and Kwon 
show that unicorn startups are now able to raise large amounts of 
capital from MFs and this capital “should enable the companies to 
 337. See Alex Edmans & Clifford Holderness, Blockholders: A Survey of Theory 
and Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Benjamin Hermalin & 
Mike Weisbach eds., 2017); see also Joseph McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The 
Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2906 
(2016). 
 338. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 313; Lerner et al., supra note 30.  
 339. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 313; Lerner et al., supra note 30. 
 340. See Kevin Gsell et al., Mayer Brown LLP, Presentation at Mayer Brown 
Seminar: Late Stage Private Placements & Private Secondary Market Liquidity 23 
(Feb. 26, 2019) (presentation slides available at https://www.mayerbrown.com/-
/media/files/perspectives-
events/events/2019/02/latestageprivateplacementsprivatesecondarymarketli.pdf); 
Morrison & Foerster LLP, Presentation: Late Stage Private Placements 26 (Dec. 
2016) (presentation slides available at https://media2.mofo.com/documents/161213-
late-stage-private-placements.pdf). 
 341. See Kevin Gsell et al., supra note 340; see Morrison & Foerster LLP, supra 
note 340. 
 342. Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 313, at 1.  
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stay private longer.”343 This Article therefore joins Lerner et al.; 
Gornall and Strebulaev; and Kwon, Lowry, and Qian in concluding 
that unicorn investments are “becoming a more important part of 
the portfolios of open-end mutual funds.”344 
There is evidence that the social return on research and 
development (especially early stage technology development) is 
much higher than the private return on research and 
development.345 Therefore, the MF346 investment in a unicorn firm 
can be viewed as a quasi-IPO because the investment provides the 
firm with a large amount of capital. It allows the firm’s founder to 
defer the costs associated with going public347 and avoid the 
pressures associated with being a public company,348 especially 
 343. Kwon et al., supra note 82, at 425.  
 344. Lerner et al., supra note 30, at 26; see also Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 
313, at 2. 
 345. See Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCAND. J. ECON. 29, 
29–31 (1992).  
 346. See What are Mutual Funds, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/us/ 
individual/education/mutual-funds (last visited Aug. 24, 2019). 
 347. Kwon et al., supra note 82, at 408. On the regulatory costs of going public, 
see Anne Beyer et al., The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent 
Literature, J. ACCT. ECON. 296 (2010). 
 348. Another plausible cause for the rise of the unicorn firms is that lucrative 
technology companies choose to stay private as long as possible in order to escape the 
pressures of short-term strategies that stem from public ownership. See 
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST 
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 7, 11 (2012); Rival Versions of 
Capitalism, The Endangered Public Company, ECONOMIST (May 19, 2012), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2012/05/19/the-endangered-public-company; see 
also Thomas J. Chemmanur & Yawen Jiao, Dual Class IPOs, Share 
Recapitalizations, and Unifications: A Theoretical Analysis (Mar. 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1108857); Ira M. Millstein, Re-
examining Board Priorities in an Era of Activism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/re-examining-board-priorities-in-an-era-of-
activism/?_r=0 (“corporate boards around the country should re-examine their 
priorities and figure out to whom they owe their fiduciary duties”). For a discussion 
on shareholder value, see COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE 
CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013). Stout also 
expresses this concern with regards to the innovation ability of large public 
companies. See Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational 
Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
685, 711 (2015); see, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate 
Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A FUNCTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 1–28 (2004); David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political 
Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 149 (2013); Bill Buxton, The 
Price of Forgoing Basic Research, BUS. WK. (Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-12-17/the-price-of-forgoing-basic-
researchbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice; The Rise 
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pressures to not invest in innovation and focus on short-term 
results.349   
This Article leaves open for future research the question of what 
the incentives of institutional investors are to invest in early stage 
technology development when they cannot capture the full benefits 
of such technologies.350 
This Article also puts forth the view that these new market 
players influence the ways in which VCs invest in unicorns, as VCs 
continue to play an important role in the governance structure of 
startup firms.351 The hypothesis is that perhaps as a result of the 
entrance of these new market players, unicorn founders now have 
more leverage to negotiate founder-friendly rounds with VCs, as 
demonstrated below.   
In conversations with several MFs’ legal advisors, they indicated 
that MFs invest in rounds where hedge funds participate.352 They 
rely on the activist hedge fund to do the monitoring for them. The 
question of whether the economic consequences of hedge fund 
intervention in the unicorn market can lead to optimal firm value 
and good corporate governance is yet to be determined. Perhaps we 
can learn from the effects of activist hedge fund interventions in 
public companies as compared to VCs and other institutional 
investors.353  
 
and Fall of Corporate R&D: Out of Dusty Labs, ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2007), 
http://www.economist.com/node/8769863. 
 349. Kwon et al., supra note 82, at 408; see also John Asker et al., Corporate 
Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342, 346 (2015).  
 350. See BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 141; BRONWYN H. HALL, THE 
PRIVATE AND SOCIAL RETURNS TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, IN TECHNOLOGY, 
R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 140 (Bruce L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield eds., 1995) 
(providing evidence that the social return to R&D is much above the private return); 
Griliches, supra note 345, at 29–44 (evaluating calculations of the social rates of 
return for research and development); see also Yoram Margalioth, Not a Panacea for 
Economic Growth: The Case of Accelerated Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 493, 500–
01 (2007).  
 351. See Robert P. Bartlett, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False 
Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 44 (2006). 
 352. Gornall and Strabulaev also conducted interviews and stated that many 
financial investors might be unable to provide effective governance and therefore 
instead focus on provisions for liquidity. Gornall & Strabulaev, supra note 313. 
 353. See Zach Cutler, 4 Big Challenges that Startups Face, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 
11, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/240742.  
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b. Hedge Funds & Comparison to Venture Capital 
 
Hedge funds also traditionally invest primarily in publicly 
traded firms. There are many reports on hedge funds investments in 
unicorn firms. Additionally, as noted, MFs often use hedge fund 
activism as a corporate governance mechanism to transform the 
operational, financial, and governance practices of a target 
corporation.354  
“Private funds are pooled investment vehicles that are excluded 
from the definition of investment company under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 by Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that 
Act.”355 There are many proposed definitions to the term “hedge 
fund.”356 According to the SEC:  
 
Hedge funds pool investors’ money and invest the 
money in an effort to make a positive return. Hedge 
funds typically have more flexible investment 
strategies than, for example, mutual funds. Many 
hedge funds seek to profit in all kinds of markets by 
using leverage (in other words, borrowing to increase 
investment exposure as well as risk), short-selling 
and other speculative investment practices that are 
not often used by mutual funds.357  
 
Hedge funds and VC funds both appeal to accredited investors or 
qualified purchasers. Generally, most U.S. hedge funds are 
structured as limited partnerships.358 In order to align the interests 
of the fund managers and their investors, hedge fund managers 
typically invest significant amounts of personal capital in these 
funds. The manager is compensated with a management fee and a 
 354. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015); see also Brav et al., supra note 316.  
 355. Private Fund Adviser Overview, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/private-fund-adviser-
resources.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2016). 
 356. David A. Vaughan, Partner, Dechert LLP, Comments for the U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n Roundtable on Hedge Funds (May 14–15, 2003). 
 357. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR BULLETIN, HEDGE FUNDS 1 (2013). 
 358. It should be noted that the specific fund structure can vary. See Managed 
Funds Ass’n, Presentation on Hedge Fund Fundamentals: How Hedge Funds Are 
Structured 2 (June 2016) (presentation slides available at 
https://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06.09.16-How-HFs-are-
Structured.pdf). 
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performance fee.359 The manager is only able to get a performance 
fee if the fund exceeds the agreed-upon benchmarks. Hedge fund 
managers are charged with making the investment decisions for the 
fund, managing portfolio risk, and determining the fund strategy.360 
There are some similarities and many differences between these 
types of funds. First, similar to VC fund managers, hedge fund 
managers have strong financial incentives to make profits. Hedge 
fund managers typically collect a significant percentage (e.g., 20%) of 
excess returns in the form of performance fees in addition to fixed 
management fees.361  
Both fund managers have strong incentives. The difference is 
that hedge fund managers invest a larger substantial amount from 
their personal wealth into their own funds (as compared to VCs).362 
Hedge fund managers cause a lock-up mechanism. A lock-up period 
is a window of time when the investors that invested in the fund are 
not allowed to redeem or sell their shares.363 The lock-up period 
depends on the specific hedge fund, but, typically, it can be for a 
period of eight months.364 Depending on the fund, the hedge fund 
investor might be able to withdraw its funds early and pay a penalty 
unless there is a “hard lock.” If there is a hard lock, then the investor 
will not be able to withdraw its funds until the end of that period. 365     
Generally, hedge fund managers have the flexibility to intervene 
in the invested companies.366 The main difference between VCs and 
hedge fund managers is the long term versus short term investment 
horizon. Hedge funds typically focus on short-term profits and look 
for a quick exit, whereas VC funds usually invest for the long-term 
potential and hold an interest in the portfolio company for several 
years before an exit. 
There is a well-known debate on the issue of hedge fund activism 
between Marty Lipton and Lucian Bebchuk. On the one hand, 
Bebchuk, who is a proponent of the economic consequences of hedge 
fund activism, asserts that hedge fund engagement with 
shareholders mitigates agency costs, and thus such companies are 
 359. Hedge fund managers are regulated by the SEC and CFTC. U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 357.  
 360. See Managed Funds Ass’n, supra note 358, at 4.  
 361. See Brav et al., supra note 316, at 4. 
 362. Compare to MF managers. 
 363. See Managed Funds Ass’n, supra note 358, at 14. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id.  
 366. See Brav et al., supra note 316, at 2–3.  
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more likely to succeed.367 On the other, Lipton claims that hedge 
funds focus on short term results that can contribute to management 
myopia.368  
More research needs to be done in order to determine the effects 
of hedge fund investment in the unicorn (target firm) and whether or 
not such activism creates value for unicorn shareholders and hedge 
fund investors. Are the hedge funds investing for longer than a year? 
How are they engaging with the portfolio companies? 
These new developments affect the governance arrangements in 
unicorn firms. In Unicorn Stock Options,369 I demonstrated that 
founders are able to push for “founder friendly” financing rounds.   
The following sheds light on the power of AVC investors to 
dictate favorable terms for themselves to mitigate their own risk. 
These powers combined with the exacerbated asymmetry of 
information between private firms and retail investors presents a 
riskier private market for unsophisticated non-accredited investors. 
 
IV. BALANCING TRADEOFFS: INVESTOR PROTECTION & CAPITAL 
FORMATION 
 
Private markets are expanding while public markets are 
shrinking. As noted, the SEC is trying to facilitate access of non-
accredited investors to private markets. The following issues need to 
be considered by regulators for proper policy design.  
 
A. Capital Formation & New Firm Formation 
 
One of the policy goals is meant to encourage capital formation 
for small and medium businesses to survive. 370 However, this Article 
warns that changing our securities laws to allow more retail investor 
participation in private markets might lead instead to a decline in 
public markets, new firm formation, innovation, and competition.371  
 367. Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of Hedge Funds as ‘Myopic Activists’, WALL ST. 
J. (Aug. 6, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873233094045 
78614004210782388; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 354. 
 368. Martin Lipton et al., Empiricism and Experience; Activism and Short-
Termism; The Real World of Business, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 
28, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/28/empiricism-and-experience-
activism-and-short-termism-the-real-world-of-business/.  
 369. Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options, supra note 4, at 154. 
 370. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 305.  
 371. See Shai Bernstein, Does Going Public Affect Innovation?, 70 J. FIN. 1365, 
1365–66 (2015); see also DAVID BROWN ET AL., LOOKING BEHIND THE DECLINING 
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The SEC is rightfully concerned about the decline in our public 
markets. As noted by SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, “our public 
capital markets are . . . less attractive to growing businesses than in 
the past.”372 Policymakers, regulators, investors, academics,373 and 
the press have been documenting the present decline in public 
market.374  
Until about eleven years ago, private tech companies turned to 
our public markets in order to raise large amounts of money.375 They 
did an IPO, transformed into public companies, and raised large 
amounts of capital from public markets. This transformation 
affected the firm’s human capital management. The public firm 
attracted new talent and allowed the old talent to leave and compete 
with the firm.376 The following further explains the changes to the 
firm following an IPO and why public markets are so important.  
Small IDEs are important to our economy because historically it 
was small firms that initially developed the most innovations in the 
twentieth century.377 Typically, new IDEs are created by 
NUMBER OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN US CAPITAL MARKETS 2 
(2017). 
(noting that these companies had “an average market capitalization of $1.8b in 
today’s dollars”); see also de Fontenay, supra note 33, at 447; Doidge et al., Eclipse, 
supra note 25, at 8.  
 372. Clayton, supra note 33.  
 373. There are many theories that try to explain the decline in IPOs. See 
Francesco Bova et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Exit Strategies of Private Firms, 
31 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 818, 819–20 (2014); Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn 
Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 170–71 (2017) (explaining that 
new regulations caused a corporate governance problem by creating unicorns that 
are not subject to the oversight of the market or supervised regular private company 
investors). Bova and others claim that the expense of regulatory compliance with the 
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) is a factor in the decline of IPOs. See generally 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended 
in scattered titles of U.S.C.). Compliance with the SOX requirements shifted the 
incentive for private firms. Bova et al., supra note 373, at 819. The new exit strategy 
of private firms is to be acquired by a public acquirer as opposed to doing an IPO. Id. 
On the other hand, some scholars argue that SOX and other early 2000s regulatory 
changes are not the cause for the decline in small firm IPOs. See Doidge et al., The 
U.S. Left Behind, supra note 25, at 569; Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap, supra 
note 25, at 486; Gao et al., supra note 25, at 1690; Rose & Solomon, supra note 110, 
at 86–87. 
 374. See de Fontenay, supra note 33, at 447; Doidge et al., Eclipse, supra note 25.  
 375. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 371, at 1365–66. 
 376. Id. 
 377. The economists Zoltan Acs and David Audertsch examined which firms 
developed the most important innovations of the twentieth century and found that 
small and new firms contributed nearly half of the innovations that they examined. 
They also found that the contribution of smaller and new firms was greater in 
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entrepreneurs that leave their incumbent firm and start a new firm 
in order to try and commercialize the perceived value of their 
knowledge.378 IDEs take advantage of market opportunities that the 
managers of established firms perhaps miss or do not see,379 
especially in emergent industries, where market power is not 
concentrated.380  
Entrepreneurs start new firms because they are not able to 
commercialize their knowledge within the incumbent firms that they 
work for.381 Another explanation is weak incentive systems in large 
incumbent firms.382 In Unicorn Stock Options,383 I explained that 
large firms typically have weak incentive systems compared to the 
smaller IDEs. IDEs use substantial compensation packages that are 
filled with stock options.384 It might be hard for established, large 
firms to design similar strong incentive systems because innovation 
projects are inherently risky and associated with uncertainty.385   
During the IPO process, the startup company transforms from a 
privately held corporation to one that is publicly traded on an 
exchange with dispersed ownership. This transformation not only 
allows the startup to raise large amounts of capital from the public, 
but also allows the startup to manage and retain its human 
immature industries, where market power was rather unconcentrated. See Zoltan 
Acs & David Audretsch, Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical 
Analysis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 678, 678–90 (1988); see also ZOLTAN ACS & DAVID 
AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS 37–44 (1990); JOSH LERNER, 
BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO BOOST 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND VENTURE CAPITAL HAVE FAILED—AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT 
IT 47 (2009).  
 378. See DAVID B. AUDRETSCH ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 51 (2016); see also Margalioth, supra note 350, at 500–01. 
 379. See LERNER, supra note 377, at 48; see also Acs & Audertsch, supra note 
377, at 678–90 (finding that the contribution of smaller and new firms was greater in 
immature industries where market power was rather unconcentrated). 
 380. See Acs & Audertsch, supra note 377, at 678–90. Audretsch analyzes the 
factors that influence the rate of new firms and observes that there are “industries in 
which small firms account for a greater percentage of the industry’s innovations”; in 
such industries, he finds that it is more likely for new startups to be formed. David 
B. Audretsch & Max Keilbach, The Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship 
24 (Nov. 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://web.mit.edu/ 
iandeseminar/Papers/Fall2005/audretschkeilbach.pdf.). 
 381. LERNER, supra note 377, at 48 (citing RICHARD N. FOSTER, INNOVATION: 
THE ATTACKERS’ ADVANTAGE (1986)).  
 382. Id.  
 383. Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options, at 154. 
 384. Id.  
 385. Id. There is no telling if proposed innovative projects will be successful, how 
long will they last, how many participants they will require, or how complex they are 
going to be.  
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capital.386 Employees who contributed to the growth of the startup 
are able to cash in following an IPO (by exercising their options and 
selling their stock) and use the proceeds to leave and compete.  
As noted in Unicorn Stock Options, when firms stay private 
longer and do not do an IPO, the practice of awarding stock options 
with “golden handcuffs”387 essentially locks-in employees who may 
prefer to leave, compete, or go work for a younger startup with more 
cutting-edge technology.388 Therefore, allowing unicorns or other 
tech companies to continue to raise large amounts of capital in 
private markets, combined with the new market conditions where 
AVCs continue to invest in unicorns, may not only cause unicorns to 
stay private longer, but perhaps also harm the ability of talent to 
leave, compete, and contribute to the innovation necessary for a 
growing economy. It may contribute to a decline in new firm 
formation. 
New firms are more likely to open new markets because they are 
risk takers, which allows their managers to choose riskier projects 
and strategies compared to established firms who choose more 
traditional projects.389 Established firms may be reluctant to open up 
new markets due to the risk of failure and uncertainty of results and 
efficiency.390 Therefore, this policy design may also affect knowledge 
spillover, competition, and innovation.  
 
 386. Id. at 138 (concluding that public firms are able to attract new human 
capital). 
 387. There is a heated debate in Silicon Valley concerning the use of the so-
called “golden handcuffs,” the 90-day stock option exercise period applicable to 
departing startup employees, and whether such practice is fair or efficient due to the 
new market dynamics. See id. at Part III.  
 388. See Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete: Equilibrium in 
High-Tech Startup Labor Markets, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235, 1239–40 (2018) (“[T]he 
lock-in effect of stock options might significantly impede the departure of much-
needed entrepreneurial talent from the most successful private firms.”). 
 389. Debra J. Aron & Edward P. Lazear, The Introduction of New Products, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. 421, 421 (1990) (“[N]ew markets are likely to be opened up by new 
entrants . . . While incumbents may be reluctant to open up new markets, they can 
be induced to follow into the new product line.”); see also LERNER, supra note 377, at 
48.  
 390. LERNER, supra note 377, at 48; Aron & Lazear, supra note 389, at 421; see 
also Thomas J. Prusa & James A. Schmitz, Jr., Can Companies Maintain Their 
Initial Innovation Thrust? A Study of the PC Software Industry, 76 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 523, 524 (1994) (demonstrating that new firms are more effective in 
introducing innovative products in the software industry.). However, it must be 
noted that established firms are encouraged to follow the new technology once 
developed by entrepreneurial firms. See Aron & Lazear, supra note 389, at 421; see 
also LERNER, supra note 377, at 48; Prusa & Schmitz, Jr., supra, at 524.  
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    B. Investor Protection & Access to Private Markets  
 
Our securities laws were designed to protect investors, and that 
is why we have rules and restrictions that regulate investments in 
private markets. This Article asks whether U.S. policymakers should 
allow non-accredited retail investors to invest in private firms. The 
following are concerns, suggestions, and recommendations about 
some of the proposed policies and solutions discussed above.  
In order to decide or design a policy to allow non-accredited 
investors to invest in private firms, we need to consider the risks 
associated with such investment and think about the cost-benefit 
analysis of such changes to our current system. As explained above, 
private markets are plagued with high risk, information asymmetry, 
and agency costs. Therefore, the proposed policies on this issue can 
be troublesome for the following reasons.  
First, with regards to private equity, it is common knowledge 
that PE funds hold assets that are very hard to value.391 Since 
valuations can be disputed, it is important to make sure that PE 
fund managers will not have incentives to distort such reported 
valuations, especially if they need to use reports in order to make 
decisions on commitments for subsequent funds.392 Some of the hard 
questions that need to be considered are: What if underperforming 
PE fund managers decide to inflate the reported returns during 
times when fundraising takes place? Could non-accredited investors 
see through these manipulations? The following are some concerns 
and questions for further research in this area.  
In the past, there have been several SEC inquiries that 
examined the possibility that PE GPs overstated their portfolio net 
asset values (NAVs) in an attempt to attract investors to future 
funds.393 Most of the assets that are held by  PE funds are private, 
and there is no liquid market for these assets.394 Therefore, 
traditionally, the investors, who are known as LPs, usually “rely on 
 391. Gregory W. Brown et al., Do Private Equity Funds Manipulate Reported 
Returns?, 132 J. FIN. ECON. 267, 267 (2019). 
 392. Id. 
 393. See, e.g., Karen Kroll, SEC Turns Up the Heat on Private Equity, Hedge 
Funds, COMPLIANCE WK. (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.complianceweek.com/sec-turns-
up-the-heat-on-private-equity-hedge-funds/4328.article; see also Peter Lattman, 
Private Equity Industry Attracts S.E.C. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 12, 
2012, 9:15 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/private-equity-industry-
attracts-s-e-c-scrutiny/. 
 394. Brown et al., supra note 391, at 267–68.  
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estimates of NAVs in quarterly reports provided by” the PE’s GPs.395 
Often, according to Brown et al., “NAVs are determined by outside 
valuation consultants and auditors, but the process is nonetheless 
subjective and is based on data produced by the portfolio companies 
that are directly owned by the funds.”396  
Another concern is with regards to fees. Note that in the past the 
SEC settled cases with PE fund managers for failing to fully inform 
investors about their benefits from fees. For example, in 2015, three 
PE fund advisers from The Blackstone Group settled charges for 
approximately $39 million for failing “to fully inform investors about 
benefits that the advisers obtained from accelerated monitoring fees 
and discounts on legal fees.”397 It is very important to design a policy 
that will take this into account and protect retail investors from 
illegal fee practices. 
With regard to illiquidity concerns, as noted, unicorn shares are 
non-liquid and many unicorns put restrictions on secondary 
trading.398 There is also controversy with regards to aggressive 
valuations of these firms.399 Policymakers should continue to review 
the secondary trading market with the goal of improving liquidity.  
Regarding the suggestion to use public closed-end funds that will 
invest in private equity funds (and perhaps also requiring that funds 
get more than 50% of their capital commitments from institutional 
investors), there is a need for further research on this option. Retail 
investors can perhaps benefit from sophisticated players that can do 
 395. Id. (An earlier version of this paper states, “LPs seeking to make 
investments in private funds face the problem of deciding which GPs to invest with. 
Very little, if anything, is known about what specific investments will be undertaken 
by the GPs after capital has been committed to a fund. Consequently, investors are 
forced to rely largely on reported values of previous funds and soft information about 
the value-relevant qualities of GPs (e.g., access to deal flow, reputation in the 
industry, etc.) when selecting private equity managers. Given that valuations from 
existing and past funds represent most of the hard information available to 
investors, it is not surprising that anecdotal evidence suggests that LPs make 
decisions under a prior belief of persistent performance of GPs. Academic evidence 
suggests that this is likely to be a valid part of the selection process. For example, 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) document that absolute and relative performance of early 
funds predicts that of subsequent funds managed by the same private equity 
firm. . . .”). Brown et al., Do Private Equity Funds Game Returns? (Feb. 28, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (available at http://somfin.gmu.edu/seminars/papers/ 
S2016/brown_gredil_kaplan_16_do_PE_funds_game_returns.pdf). 
396 Brown et al., supra note 391, at 267. 
 397. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Blackstone Charged with 
Disclosure Failures (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
235.html. 
 398. See Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options, supra note 4, at 172–74.  
 399. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
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the monitoring for them and negotiate the contractual terms with 
the PE funds. However, there are many unanswered questions that 
need to be answered regarding fee structures and disclosure of fees 
and information regarding uninvested capital. There is a need for 
more research on asymmetric information of these funds and best 
practices in order to answer these questions. For example, should 
the SEC mandate a waiver of management fees on uninvested 
capital by closed-end funds? Should the SEC put restrictions (or 
limits) on underlying PE fund management fees? These discussions 
are outside the scope of this Article.  
The following is a discussion of how the rise in AVC investors is 
affecting unicorn ownership structures, decision making 
mechanisms, and corporate governance arrangements. It highlights 
the risks associated with investing in a unicorn firm. 
 
C. Investor Protection & Rise in AVC Investors 
 
Unicorn ownership structures are different from traditional 
patterns of privately held startup firms or large-scale public firms. 
Classical theories of entrepreneurship, ownership of the firm, and 
corporate governance does not capture the new structures and 
special attributes of the unicorn firm.400  
Several scholars have examined the distinctive characteristics of 
firm ownership. Specifically, Williamson, Klein, Crawford, Alchian, 
Hansmann, Kraakman and most recently Pollman discussed the 
impact of “transaction-specific investments on the assignment of 
ownership.”401 The following builds on their theories and explains 
the various costs associated with ownership of a unicorn firm.  
AVCs have divergent interests concerning the conduct of the 
unicorn firm's affairs. AVCs do not share the same characteristics or 
interests and do not transact with the firm under similar 
circumstances (or market contracting). They act strategically to 
advance their own benefits. Therefore, their collective decision-
making costs are very high. As postulated by Hansmann, “[E]ven if 
 400. See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996); 
Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155 (2019). For a 
discussion of and historical review of the establishment of the firm and the notion of 
entity shielding, see Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006) (describing the development of entity shielding in four 
historical epochs: ancient Rome, the Italian Middle Ages, England of the 17th–19th 
centuries, and the United States from the 19th century to the present).  
 401. Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 268 
(1988). 
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no patron acts strategically such processes may yield decisions that 
are collectively inefficient in the sense that they do not maximize 
aggregate patron surplus.”402 This is evident from the recent stories 
on unicorn market performance post-IPO and corporate governance 
failures. For example, see the recent story of the WeWork 
catastrophe below.  
Unicorn shareholders may deal with “horizontal” governance 
issues.403 Horizontal disputes between shareholders arise when some 
shareholders take advantage of other shareholders by exercising 
influence and control.404 Therefore, exploring the rise in AVCs as 
new investor groups, specifically, their contractual rights, control 
rights, fiduciary duties, and power struggles, is extremely important 
because courts may be required to decide on disputes between 
unicorn investors in the future.  
Note that Delaware courts already grapple with determining 
which strategic or powerful contractual rights (such as consent or 
blocking powers) deem an investor (or debtor) in a startup to be a 
“controlling stockholder” who also owes a fiduciary duty to the 
company.405 Are AVCs controlling stockholders?  
As illustrated in this Article, AVCs are comprised of many 
different types of investors with different incentives, contractual 
rights, and characteristics, including pooled investment vehicles that 
owe fiduciary duties to their own investors. The decision to deem an 
investor a controlling stockholder imposes fiduciary duties on a third 
party that has powerful contractual rights and obligates it to act in 
the best interests of the other stockholders (especially minority).  
There are opposing views on whether courts should base their 
decision to enforce the parties’ rights according to contract law or 
fiduciary doctrine (where preferred stock is required to maximize 
 402. Id. at 278.  
 403. Robert Bartlett & Eric Talley, Law and Corporate Governance, in 1 THE 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 177, 179 (Benjamin E. 
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017).  
 404. Id. at 185–86. 
 405. VCs traditionally invest in startups using convertible preferred stock. See 
Fried & Ganor, supra note 32, at 981–82; Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 320; 
William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital 
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990). For more on this, see Juliet P. 
Kostritsky, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Contextual Approach to Fiduciary Duties 
Owed to Preferred Stockholders from Venture Capital to Public Preferred to Family 
Business, 70 RUTGERS L. REV. 43, 43 (2017) (examining “whether corporations should 
owe fiduciary duties to their preferred stockholders as preferred stockholders across 
all settings of preferred stock holding.”). 
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firm value and is subordinate to the rights of common).406 The 
courts’ decisions on these matters are important for the future of 
strategic investments in startup firms. Scholars have focused on 
power struggles between venture capitalists as preferred 
shareholders and other common shareholders. There is a need to pay 
attention to the new phenomenon of AVC investors and the ways in 
which they invest.  
Another factor to consider concerning investor protection is a 
concern that the valuations of unicorn firms are inflated and their 
public debut might be disappointing to future investors. To 
illustrate, note that last year marked the beginning of the “unicorn 
stampede,”407 where twenty-eight unicorn firms finally went 
public.408 Unfortunately, the stock performance of the largest 
unicorns, including Uber and Lyft, was very disappointing despite 
the fact that they raised billions of dollars before going public.409  
Uber raised $14 billion in pre-IPO private financing rounds, and 
its stock lost approximately 17%.410 Lyft raised $5 billion in pre-IPO 
rounds, and its stock lost approximately 34%.411 These companies 
entered the public markets after years of raising large amounts in 
private financing rounds from AVC investors.412 Are these stories 
 406. See the Trados case to illustrate the issues that arise in VC-backed 
startups, where the board of directors are usually appointed by the investors. 
Additionally, depending on the proposed transaction, preferred stockholders and 
common stockholders might have conflicting interests. Trados involved claims 
against the board of a startup that was sold in a merger transaction. The court 
applied the fairness review standard. See generally In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 
73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). For an example of a subsequent court attempting to 
interpret Trados’s holding on the mechanics of fairness review, see generally In re 
Nine Sys. Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 3940-VCN, 2014 WL 4383127 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
See Abraham J.B. Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE W. 
RSRV. L. REV. 51, 75–76 (2015); Abraham J.B. Cable, Does Trados Matter?, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 7, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2019/11/07/does-trados-matter/; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 32; Adam 
Katz, Addressing the Harm to Common Stockholders in Trados and Nine Systems, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 234 (2018); Kostritsky, supra note 405.  
 407. This term was coined by Matt Levine. See Levine, supra note 2. 
 408. Julia Boorstin, Era of Mega-Funded, Money-Losing Unicorn Start-Ups Is 
Coming to an End, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2020, 4:15 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2020/01/23/era-of-mega-funded-money-losing-unicorns-is-coming-to-an-end.html. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id.  
 412. Daniel Strauss, Goldman Sachs Analyzed 4,481 IPOs Over 25 Years and 
Concluded That These 5 Attributes Can Make or Break a Newly Public Company, 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2019, 8:11 AM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/ 
news/stocks/5-most-important-factors-for-successful-ipo-performance-goldman-sachs-
2019-9-1028507003#sector-and-industry1. 
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going to have affect the decision of unicorn founders to go public in 
the near future? Maybe.  
Matt Levine, from Bloomberg, was spot-on when he stated that 
“private markets are the new public markets.”413 Firms are raising 
more money in private financing rounds than in public ones.414 In 
2018, companies raised $2.9 trillion in unregistered, exempt private 
placements, which is more than double the amount that they raised 
in public registered markets ($1.4 trillion).415 It is not surprising 
that retail investors want to invest in private markets, when private 
offerings are perceived as more lucrative than public markets 
despite the risks that are associated with these investments.416 
Moreover, and more importantly, unicorns are already flush with 
capital and are able to attract large amounts of financing from 
AVCs. Moreover, some AVCs may bargain for different contractual 
rights than traditional VC investors when investing in unicorns, and 
those rights include aggressive redemption rights and post-IPO 
pricing “ratchets.” These contractual mechanisms are designed to 
protect AVCs from down rounds and lower post-IPO valuation.  
However, there are many risks associated with private 
investments. The following WeWork example illustrates the risks 
associated with AVC investments to investor protection, especially 
concerning the conflict of interest between the various investors in 
unicorn firms that contribute to moral hazard problems and 
mispricing of IPOs. 
The recent WeWork failed IPO fiasco is a perfect example of the 
new “toxic unicorn bubble.”417 The We Company, originally called 
 413. Matt Levine, Private Markets Might Be Too Nice, BLOOMBERG OP. (Oct. 31, 
2019, 12:12 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-31/private-
markets-might-be-too-nice; see Anat Alon-Beck, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce: 
‘Regulation Can Stifle the Creative Juices in People’, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2020, 12:27 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/01/13/sec-commissioner-hester-
peirce-regulation-can-stifle-the-creative-juices-in-people/#6b2b3b8b2539; Anat Alon-
Beck, The Unicorn War for Talent: The Employees Fire Back. WeWork Is the Latest 
Example, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2020, 12:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
anatalonbeck/2020/01/29/the-unicorn-war-for-talent-the-employees-fire-back-
wework-is-the-latest-example/#75c8c98635da. 
 414. de Fontenay, supra note 33, at 448–50; see Kupor, supra note 33; see also 
Statement of Renee Jones, supra note 4, at 6.  
 415. Concept Release on Harmonization, supra note 39, at 30465. 
 416. IRA M. MILLSTEIN CTR., COLUMBIA L. SCH., PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AT A 
PUBLIC CROSSROADS: STUDYING THE RAPIDLY EVOLVING WORLD OF CORPORATE 
OWNERSHIP 1 (2019) (“Capital formation in the United States is currently in the 
midst of a significant transition . . . .”). 
 417. Coffee, Jr., supra note 206. 
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WeWork, decided to postpone its IPO last year.418 There could be 
several reasons for that move, including a sharp decline in its 
reported valuation, a call to fix its corporate governance 
mechanisms, and a successful initiative to oust the company’s 
founder Adam Neumann as CEO.419 In October 2019, one of 
WeWork’s AVC investors––SoftBank––ousted Adam Neumann as 
CEO and then took control over 80% of WeWork.420 
WeWork is a technology-based real estate business, which 
provides shared workspaces for small businesses and startups and is 
a member of the notorious unicorn club.421 A look into WeWork’s S-1 
filings (and revised filings) with the SEC reveals how AVC investors 
bargained for different contractual rights than traditional VCs 
investors. WeWork’s AVC investors obtained new contractual rights 
in order to protect their expected rate of return (instead of 
monitoring rights) at the expense of other shareholders, including 
future shareholders.422  
As noted above in Part III, finance scholars, specifically Lerner 
et al., have been documenting the different contractual rights that 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Annie Palmer & Christine Wang, SoftBank Takes 80% Ownership of 
WeWork, Announces $5 Billion in New Financing Package, CNBC (Oct. 22, 2019, 
9:52 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/23/softbank-to-take-control-of-wework.html.  
 421. See, e.g., Scott Austin et al., The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/graphics/billion-dollar-club/ (showing list and 
valuation of firms as of May 2017); Ben Zimmer, How ‘Unicorns’ Became Silicon 
Valley Companies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2015, 10:26 AM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/how-unicorns-became-silicon-valley-companies-1426861606; Billion Dollar 
Startups, CNN TECH., https://money.cnn.com/interactive/technology/billion-dollar-
startups/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2021); The Global Unicorn Club, CB INSIGHTS, 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies (last visited Jan. 1, 2021); 
The Unicorn List, FORTUNE (2016), http://fortune.com/unicorns/. Companies that are 
valued at over $10 billion are called “decacorns.” See Sarah Frier & Eric Newcomer, 
The Fuzzy, Insane Math That’s Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech Companies, 
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Mar. 17, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-math-that-s-creating-so-many-billion-dollar-
tech-companies (coining the term “decacorns”); see also Jillian D’onfro, There Are So 
Many $10 Billion Startups That There's a New Name for Them: 'Decacorns’, BUS. 
INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/decacorn-is-the-
new-unicorn-2015-3.  
 422. Coffee, Jr., supra note 206; see WeWork’s Anti-Dilution Provisions Could 
Grant $400 Million to SoftBank and Others, RENAISSANCE CAP. (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://www.renaissancecapital.com/IPO-Center/News/64947/WeWork’s-anti-
dilution-provisions-could-grant-$400-million-to-SoftBank-and; see also Kate Rooney, 
WeWork Investors Like SoftBank Have an Obscure Protection Worth Millions in a 
Devalued IPO, CNBC (Sept. 24, 2019, 12:10 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2019/09/24/softbank-has-a-multi-million-dollar-protection-in-weworks-ipo.html. 
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MFs bargain for when investing in unicorns, which include 
redemption rights and pricing “ratchets.” This Article is part of a 
research project that sheds light on the new contractual provisions 
for which AVCs bargain.  
MFs are not the only AVC investors that bargain for anti-
dilution protection. SoftBank, for example, also bargained for an 
anti-dilution provision when it invested in WeWork. John C. 
Coffee423 was the first to report that SoftBank holds IPO ratchet 
clauses, as follows:  
 
According to a computation by Renaissance Capital, 
LLC, which specializes in analyzing IPOs, the 
ratchet clause held by SoftBank would have entitled 
it to more than $400 million in additional shares if 
WeWork’s IPO were to come in with less than a $14.5 
billion valuation. If the IPO came in as low as $10.5 
billion, the shares to which SoftBank (and certain 
other holders of similar ratchet clauses) would have 
been entitled jumped to slightly over $500 
million. Today, WeWork is probably worth well less 
than $10 billion. But nothing about this potential 
dilution was disclosed to the public. Instead, 
WeWork’s prospectus said (way back in its financial 
statements at page F-115) only that: 
 
“The conversion ratio for the Senior Preferred Stock 
is adjusted on a broad weighted-average basis in the 
event of an issuance (or deemed issuance) below the 
applicable Senior Preferred stock price, as adjusted.” 
 
Unfortunately, as noted by Coffee,  this cryptic disclosure 
tells the IPO investor very little about SoftBank’s rights. IPO 
ratchets are contractual rights that give investors additional shares 
if the valuation following the IPO falls below the valuation before 
the IPO (that is measured by the valuation in the last round of 
financing).424 What this means is that in the event that the IPO 
price falls below the latest valuation prior to IPO, more shares are 
issued to the alternative investor, at the expense of the public 
investors.  
 423. Coffee, Jr., supra note 206.  
 424. Id. 
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The WeWork example illustrates that investors can be left in the 
dark when it comes to the financings of unicorn firms. AVCs 
sometimes bargain for these provisions and WeWork is not the only 
case.425 That is why we need a policy that ensures more disclosures 
and not less.  
There is a moral hazard problem where AVC investors have an 
incentive to continue to invest in late stage rounds and drive the 
valuation of the unicorn up because they negotiated for provisions 
that protect them from future post-IPO lower valuation (“down 
round”).426  
If policymakers and regulators are going to let retail investors 
invest in private markets and privately held unicorns despite the 
misalignment of incentives between their current investors, then 
there is a need for more disclosure of information and policy design 




Alternative venture capital investors (AVCs), which include 
mutual funds, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, and corporate 
venture capitalists, have rightly been singled out for “hunting 
unicorns.” They look for the next billion-dollar startup, invest large 
amounts of capital in late stage rounds, and provide incentives to the 
management team and board of directors to stay private longer.427  
Recent changes to our securities laws, coupled with new market 
conditions and geopolitical considerations, allow AVCs to invest in 
unicorn firms.428 Thanks to these developments, there is a dramatic 
increase in alternative financing vehicles and new capital sources,429 
 425. Id. (“[L]ate stage investors in Square, Inc. held a full ratchet when Square 
went public in 2015, which resulted in the issuance of $93 million in additional 
shares. Chegg, Inc.’s IPO in 2013 had a similar clause that resulted in $146 million 
in additional shares, and Box, Inc.’s IPO in 2015 saw an additional issuance of $67 
million pursuant to its ratchet clause.”). 
 426. Id. 
 427. See PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, VENTURE MONITOR 4Q 
(2018); Lerner et al., supra note 30.  
 428. See generally COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REGUL., U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKETS 
ARE STAGNATING (2017). 
 429. Brorsen, supra note 30; See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 30, at 6–7 (noting 
that private fundraising in 2017 reached nearly $750 billion—more than six times 
the level of private funds raised fifteen years ago); Lerner et al., supra note 30; see 
also Levine, supra note 30 (“[L]ate-stage private investors now are doing the job that 
the post-IPO public investors used to do. . . .”). 
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which contribute to the fact that equity ownership is changing in the 
United States. 
The traditional Anglo-American430 corporate law tale used to 
begin with a story about technology dictating that a few well-off 
individuals alone cannot provide enough capital for large enterprises 
to scale.431 Capital, therefore, must be pulled from many estranged 
shareholders.432 Ownership was further dispersed due to 
shareholders who diversify their own holdings.433 This tale no longer 
holds. 
In reality, there has been a dramatic increase in alternative 
capital sources.434 These changes contribute to incentive 
misalignment between the various groups of AVCs and raise the 
concern that these developments may affect private ordering. As a 
direct result, VC investment rounds in unicorn firms are structured 
as “founder-friendly” financing rounds. 
The contractual mechanisms that VC investors traditionally 
used to avoid opportunism by founders have also changed. These 
changes give unicorn founders greater power vis-à-vis preferred 
shareholders and minority common shareholders to oppose a sale 
and keep the company private longer. AVC investors may have an 
incentive to continue investing in later stages, and so they ex-ante 
bargain for contractual provisions, such as redemptions and anti-
dilutive IPO ratchets rather than monitoring rights. 
These changes not only affect the actions of unicorn founders and 
their management teams but can have serious effects on economic 
activity. Monitoring founders and management is extremely 
important, because misbehavior, such as rent-seeking, corruption, or 
other illegal activities, might hamper not only managers’ decision-
making process but may also reduce incentives and opportunities to 
invest in other innovative enterprises in the future. 
Both innovation and greater access to capital are important 
policy goals. However, our securities laws are also designed to 
protect investors. Policymakers must consider the ways in which 
 430. For an examination of the origins of the private company in Britain, see 
Ron Harris, The Private Origins of the Private Company: Britain 1862–1907, 33 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2013). According to Harris, “[C]ontrary to a common 
misconception, business corporations did not begin small (and private) and only then 
grew bigger (and public).” Id. at 340.  
 431. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 10, 10 (1991).  
 432. Id. 
 433. Id. 
 434. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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AVCs are investing in unicorn firms and disrupting the private 
market ecosystem. They heighten the effects of information 
asymmetry for retail investors and highlight the risks associated 
with expanding exempt offerings while allowing retail investors into 
private markets without adequate protections. 
This Article cautions that investing in private markets and 
private firms is risky due to information asymmetry and illiquidity. 
Policymakers should consider ways to enhance our public markets 
and investor protections rather than trying to substitute them. 
